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INTRODUCTION
In his essay entitled "The War of Gods and Demons," I after
a plea for what he calls "psychological history" as opposed to
purely economic and political history, G. K. Chesterton explairu
the war to extinction between Rome and Carthage as a contest,
not merely of commercial interests, but of two

deep~y

antago-

nistic cultures, world outlooks, religious atmospheres. He maintains that the Roman with his friendly, naturalistic gods, his
ideal of "prisca virtus", his deep regard for the sanctity and
inviolability of the home and family, was sustained in the face
of death and defeat during the second, and most deoisive, portion of the struggle, not by economic considerations, not by
hope of world empire, but by a hatred of what he sensed in the
Carthaginian culture,- a world outlook appalling to him in its
basic despair, in its cruel commercialism, its utter disregard
for objective moral standards, its inhuman cultus of bloodthirsty Eastern gods. Thus Mr. Chesterton introduces a new
aspect, suggests a more basic motive for the death struggle of
these two great powers.
The problem then arises: is this suggestion justified historically? What do we actually know of the civilization and
culture, the spirit and moral atmosphere of Carthage as recorded by the ancients themselves? Do the historical sources justify Mr. Chesterton's interpretation, or is it enough to explain
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the Punic wars simply as a contest for political and economic
supremacy between two states having essentially the same moral
outlook and values? Obviously, the first step toward a solution
must be an examination of the ancient authors with a view to
determining the nature of Carthaginian civilization and culture l
especially at the time of the Punic wars.

That is what we pro-

pose to undertake in this investigation.
Our attempt will be to discover not so much what Carthage
~,

but what she was.

We shall not try, therefore, to trace

the full history of the city, and historical details will be
considered only in so far as they cast light on some significant
trait of national character; rather we shall attempt to discover the reality beloind those details. R.B.Smith states the
problem thus:
If we try, as we cannot help trying, to picture to ourselves
the daily life and personal characteristics of the people ••• and
to ask, not what the Carthaginians did, for that we know, but
what they were, we are confronted by the provoking blank in the
national history •••
It is with the hope of filling in somewhat that "provoking
blank in the national history" of Carthage that we shall
examine the ancient sources, extracting all that casts light on
the people themselves, their civilization and culture, interpreting this data to determine their national character. And,
since the investigation draws much of its importance from its
connection with the larger problem of the Punic wars, our
interest will be centered on the civilization and culture of
Carthage especially during the period of those wars.
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In regard to sources, the ancient Latin and Greek authors,
particularly the historians, will be used almost exclusively as
the basis of conclusions. It is true that the details they offer
conoerning the national oharacter of Carthage are limited and
fragmentary. Yet, in one sense, this limitation is an advantage,
sinoe it allows an exhaustive study of what data is provided. It
will be objeoted, of course, that a study of Carthage through
the acoounts of her enemies, the Greeks and Romans, will neoessarily be prejudioed and lacking in objective value. We can
reply, first, that if Greek and Roman writers of different periods present a single oonsistent pioture of the nation, and one
that appears to be borne out by the actions of that nation, that
is, by simple historical facts, then it is safe to say that
their attitude must be justified by reality. Moreover, the Greek
and Roman attitude itself is almost as important for our ultimate purpose as the reality it reflects, sinoe it helps toward
a basic explanation of their centuries of opposition to Carthaginian expansion. Finally, we must be satisfied with Greek and
Roman sources for the very good reason that no others exist. It
would be highly desirable to learn the national charaoter of
Carthage from Carthaginian historians, and to possess an acoount
of the Punic Wars from the Carthaginian point of view. The faot
is, however, that no suoh writings exist, and so we must make
the best of what we have.
Much has been written on Carthage in modern times, both in
the course of general histories of the ancient world, like those
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of Mommson, Rostovtzeff, and Duruy, or in the form of special
studies, like those of R. B. Smith3 and A. J. Church. 4 The
general histories, naturally, touch on the background of Carthage only in so far as it is necessary to an understanding of her
political and economic history. Of the special studies, Smith
is the most satisfactory; his style is interesting and his interpretations moderate. His effort to achieve literary excellence, hosever, is made at the cost of full citation and annotation of prime sources. Moreover, he is not concerned exclusively with the nature of Carthage herself, but treats her history
at greater length. Church, too, is concerned mainly with political development and history; his account of Carthaginian civilization and culture is rather cursory and superficial, inferior
to that of some of the general histories of the ancient world.
Neither had as his prime aim the precise object of this investigation. All the existing accounts are most useful, of course,
as guides to prime sources and aids to interpretation. We shall
be concerned with them only incidentally, however, attempting
rather to examine carefully the prime sources themselves and to
draw, as far as possible, our own conclusions.
The data gathered from the ancient writers will be organized
under the two main divisions of civilization and culture. The
term "civilization" is here taken in its root meaning as signifying all that has to do with law and its enforcement, so that
we can say with E. R. Hull, S. J.:5 "Civilization, therefore,
I define as a state of social organization which binds together
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a race or people into a unity under a definite social code •••
In short, civilization is essentially the reign of social law."
Thus, under the head of "civilization" we shall group all material on the civil constitution and laws of Carthage and their
enforcement.
Again, we follow Hull in distinguishing between "civilization" and"culture" as follows: 6
Civilization ••• means essentially the reign of social law •••
Everything else which is found embodied in a given system of
civilization must therefore for the sake of clearness be called
by some other name; and that name, for want of a better, we may
call "culture". Culture etymologically means the cultivation of
something, and therefore the application of human faculties to
some object.
Thus, the faculties applied in the material sphere gives
rise to material culture,- agriculture, commerce, resources,
territorial dominion, etc. In the same way intellectual culture
will include intellectual and aesthetic development,- art, literature, philosophy, and the amenities - while religion and national ideals will fall under moral culture. The division, no
doubt, can be questioned; it is proposed, however, not as an absolute, but rather as a convenient framework for the organization of material. These two large aspects or approaches, the
civil and cultural, while complementing and enlightening each
other, will, we hope, join in focus upon the Carthaginians themselves, drawing out the salient features of their nature, enabling us to see with some accuracy "what they were", especially
at the time of the Punic Wars.
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Notes to Introduction
1 The Everlasting Man, New York, Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1930,
158.

-

2 cartha~e and the Carthaginians, London, Longman's, Green,
1879, 9.
3

.2£.

cit.

4 Carthage (Story of Nations Series), New York, Putnam, 1893.
5 Civilization and Culture, London, Sands and Co., 1916, 10.
6 Ibid., 15.

PST ONE

CIVILIZATION

CHAPTER I
TBI CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF CARTHAGE

I. General !lR!

~

Constitution

Our mos\ complete and reliable authority on the cons\i\ution
of Carthage is Aristotle, who sketches i\s broad outline in the
characterizing it, with that of Sparta and Crete, as
-politics,
l
"justly famous.· He classifies the government of Carthage as an
aristocracy, "the government of more tban one, yet only a few,"
so called "eitber because the best men rule or because \hey rule
with a view

\0

wbat is best for tbe state ana for its members. H2

Yet it is not a pure aristocracy, governed by the "best in
virtue absolutely," under wbicb -tbe same person is a good man
and a good citizen absolutely,"- but a secondary type of aristocracy, in wbicb tbe rulers are "good men in rela\ion to some
arbitrary standard, ••• good relatively to tbeir own form of
government.·3 -For even in tbe states tbat do not pay any public
attention to virtue there are nevertheless 80me men that are
held in high esteem and are thougbt wortby of respect. Where
then the constitution takes in view wealtb and virtue as well as
the common people, as, for instance, at Carthage, this is of the
nature of an aristocracy.-4
II.

Chief Magistrates

According to Aristotle, the constitution of Cartbage provided
for cbief magistrates whom he calls kings, corresponding to the
kings at Sparta,5probably in their twofold capacity as protector.

OHAPTER I
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF OARTHAGE
I. General Iln!

~

Oonstitution

Our most complete and reliable authority on the constitution
of Carthage is Aristotle, who sketches its broad outline in the
Politics. characterizing it. with that of Sparta and Orete. as
l
"justly famous.· He classifies the government of Oarthage as an
aristocracy, "the government of more tban one. yet only a few,·
so called "eitber because the best men rule or because tbey rule
with a view to what is best for the state ana for its members. H2
Yet it is not a pure aristocracy, governed b.Y the Hbeat in
virtue absolutely.· under which -the same person is a good man
and a good citizen absolutely,"- but a secondary type of aristocracy. in which the rulers are "good men in relation to some
arbitrary standard •••• good relatively to their own form of
government.-3 -For even in the states that do not pay any publio
attention to virtue there are nevertheless aome men that are
held in high esteem and are thought worthy of respect. Where
then the constitution takes in view wealth and virtue as well as
the common people, as. for instance, at Carthage, this is of the
nature of an aristocracy.-4
II. Chief Magistrates
According to Aristotle, the constitution of Oarthage provided
for chief magistrates whom he calls kings, corresponding to the
kings at Sparta,5probably in their twofold capacity as protector

2

and rulers of t.he stat.e. They held office, however, not. by

here~

ditary right as at Sparta, but. b.Y election on t.he double basis
of wea1t.h and merit.. "It therefore e1ect.ion by wea1t.h is oligarchical and election by merit aristocrat.ic, this will be a t.hird
system exhibit.ed in t.he organization of t.he const.it.ution of Carthage, for there elections are made with an eye to these two
qualifications, and especially elections to t.he most import.ant
offices, those of t.he kings and of t.he genera1s."S Aristotle regards this as an advantage over the Spartan system, for in
7

pointing out t.he resemb1ences of the two canstitutions, he says:
"It. is another superior teature t.hat the Cart.haginian kings are
not confined to the same taml1y, and that one ot no particular
distinctlon."
This much we know about the klngs trom Arlst.ot1e; later
writers till in a tew details. Nepos tells us their number and
term ot ottioe: 8 .&s ls true ot the consuls at Rome, so at Carthage two kings were elected annually tor a term of one year.·
9

Livy calls t.hem b.Y thelr more common and proper title ·sutetes,
qui su_us Poenis eat magistratus," and again,10 "sufetes (quod
ve1ut consulare imperium apud nos erat),· ... a title which most
modern historians and commentators trace to the Hebrew word
shotetim,p commonly rendered in Biblical English as judse, though
the otticials bearing this title at Carthage held exeoutive as
well as judioia1 authority.
What were the funotions ot the sutetes? Up to Aristotle's
time they must have held, in oonjunotion with a group ot Elders
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who probably formed their cabinet or privy council, the supreme
legislative and executive authority. "The reference of some

matters and not of others to the popular assembly rests with the
kings in consultation with the Elders in case they agree unanimously, but failing that these matters also lie with the people;
11
and ••• the kings introduce business in the assembly •••••
In later times, during the Punic wars, though the sufetes
must have lost much of their power

and

authority through the

limitations imposed on them bf the excessive power of the order
of JUdges,12sti11 they retained the prerogative of calling the
senate or assembly together~3and probably of introducing business and acting as spokesmen for the body, as we find in Polybius' account of the Roman embassy to Carthage at the beginning
of the Second Punic war: 14
The oldest member of the embassy, pointing to the bosom of
his toga, told the senate that it held both peace and war for
them. Therefore he would let fall from it and leave with them
whichever of the two they bade him. The Carthaginian sufete bade
him let fall whichever the Romans chose, and when the envoy said
he would let fall war, many of the senators cried out at onee,
'We accept it.'·
Finally, the sufetes must have acted as Judges in popular
law suits, holding court daily in a busy quarter of the city,
for Livy tells us that after the Second Punic war Arlsto, the
Tyrian agent of the exiled Hannibal, hung his written message to
the senate ot Carthage ·celeberrimo loco, supra sedem quotidianam magistratuum prima vespera," and that it was discovered
15
"postero die, cum sufetes ad jus dicendum consedissent.·

4

III. The Council ot Elders

-

-

According to Aristotle's account, there was a council ot
Elders ( YEpouaCa) corresponding to the Elders at Sparta,
though the exact nature ot this group, its tunction, number,
and mode of selection is not clear from the sources, and later
commentators are hopelessly at odds upon the difficUlty.16Ariatotle tells us that ·the kings and the council of alders correspond to the kings and Elders at Sparta,.17 and we know that the
council at Sparta, like that at Crete also,18consisted of twenty
eight members and acted as a single agency ln conjunction with
the kings. 19 The Gerousia at Carthage may very well have been
the same in number, tormlng, together wlth the kings, that council ot which Livy speaks as negotiating tor peace at the end ot
the Second Punic war: 20
Carthaginienses oratores ad pacem petendaa mittunt triginta
seniorum principes. Id erat sanctius apud lllos cone ilium
maximlque ad lpsum senatum regendum vls.
It is quite clear trom this and other sources that there existed along with the council ot twenty eight another larger
body, the senate, ot which this group tormed but a part, and
trom which lt probably drew its members. 2l In the passage just
quoted Livy points out that this ·consilium· comprised the
·principes seniorum," whlle in another place 22 he explaines:
·seniores, ita senatum vocabant.· The councll, then, were the
·prlncipes senlorum,· the senate. ·seniores." This distinction
between the council and the larger senate is evident from Pol,.

5

bius' account ot the terms ottered

~

the Romans betore the

Third Punic war, which included the surrender ot three hundred
hostages, the sons ot senators (~wv lx ~~~ O~XA~~OU ) and ot
members of the council

(

1...

')

~x ~~~ yePOucrLa~

, 23 while atter the

capture of New Carthage, according to the same author, Scipio
"set apart Mago and the Carthaginians who were with him, two ot
them being members ot the council ot Elders (yepoucr{a) and titteen members ot the senate (cr~YXA~~O~ ),24
The council ot Elders must have been made up ot the senators
most distinguished tor ability, family, and wealth, since these
were the standards ot excellence at Carthage, according to Aris25
totle.
In his time, the legislative power ot t he council was
apparently absolute when its members agreed with the two kings:
The reference of some matters and not ot others to the popular assembly rests with the kings in conSUltation with the
Elders in case they agree unanimo~gly, but tailing that, these
matters also lie with the people.
There is question here, ot course, as to whether Aristotle,
in speaking ot the Elders

(ylpov~€~

) means the councilor the

entire senate. It is likely that he speaks ot the council; this
would be more in accord with the

praq~ice

at Sparta, and much

more practical. The entire senate woula be too unwieldy a group
to act thus in harmony with the kings in the multiple attairs ot
government; its membership must have

~een

tairly large, since

Justinus relates that, at a perios of more than titty years
betore the writing of the Politics, ·centum ex numero senatorum
judices deliguntur.- 27
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The function of this council of Elders at the time of Aristotle, then, was not merely to advise the kings, but actually to
share their power of government. Later, however, they must have
lost this prerogative with the decline in the monarchy and the
rise of oligarchical rule. While Livy speaks of them even in the
time of the Punic wars as ·vis ad ipsum senatum regendum," they
probably exercised this influence more through personal authority as Mprincipes seniorum M than in virtue of any authority invested in the council itself. The occasions upon which the council of Thirty appears in Livy's account,28_ the only times he
distinguishes between this group and the rest of the senate- is
when they are sent as a delegation to ask tor peace, which indicates that at least the conventional form of the council was retained as a convenient committee tor carrying out diplomatic and
civic formalities under the authority of the senate. This is
borne out by Polybius, who speaks of -the thirty of the Gerousia
who were sent to reconcile Hanno and Hamilcar toward the end of
the Mercenary war. 29
IV • .IS! .-S.-en=a.-t...
e
Little is said of the senate at the early peri04; in fact it
is not mentioned by Aristotle. However, we know that it existed
in his time from the fact that a board of 104 Judges, whom he
does mention, was chosen from among its members, according to
Justinus. 30 This fact indicates also that it must have been a
rather large body. The silence of Aristotle may be accounted for

7

b.Y assuming that the senate was ot little importance at his
time, the power of state being in t he hands of the kings and the
Gerousia. The senate, like the council of Elders and the Judges
drawn from it, would have been composed of representatives of
families distinguished tor wealth and influence.
In the time of the Punic wars, however, w.e know that the Senate was of great importance. There are several incidents in
polybius which show that the senators had the prerogative ot
deciding tor war or peace. For example, when Regulus was threatening Carthage, it was the senate that d.'ermined not to submit,
but to hold out against him to the end. 3l Again, the senate decided to accept war from the Roman ambassado.s who came to remonstrate about the aggression of Hannibal. 32 Finally, when
Scipio proposed terms at the end of tohe Second Punic war, at the
instigation and under the influence of Hannibal, the senate
·voted to make the treaty on the above conditions and ••• at once
dispatched envoys with orders to agree with them. w33
V.

l!!!

.;;oH~:un=d_r_e_d

How can we account for this change, the shift in power from
the hands of the kings and Elders to the senatorial class? It
was due, probably, to the influence of a new institution, introduced into the Carthaginian system at a comparatively late hour
to restore the balance of power between the nobility and the
senatorial order. 34 For the family of Mago, through superior
ability, wealth, and influence had come to dominate the state to
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such an extent that they threatened to become absolute. Justinus
atter telling of the death ot Hamilcar in the Sicilian war (479

a.c.),

says:35

Deinde cum fami11a tanta imperatoram gravis liberae civitati
esset, omniaque ipsi agerent simul et judicarent, centum ex numeto senatorum judices deliguntur, qu1 reversis a bello ducibus,
rationem rerum gestarum exigerent, ut hoc metu ita in bello imperia eogitarent ut dom1 judicia legesque respicerent.
This new commission was instituted, then, as a check upon the
power ot the kings and generals, to exact an account ot their
administration and to punish them when necessary.
Aristotle, writing about fitty years atter the death of Hamilcar, speaks of this "magistracy of 104" as one of the chiet
institutions of carthag~~ "corresponding to the Ephors at Spart~M
the Carthaginian institution is superior to that of Sparta, bowever, in tbis, that nthe Epbors are drawn trom any class, but the
Carthaginians elect this magistracy ~ merit." He refers once
more to the commission. 37 tbis time as "the supreme magistracy of
the Hundred," explaining that its members were elected by the
Boards of Five, ot wbich we will speak later. Thus it appears
that even in the time ot Aristotle, the Hundred (as the commission is generally referred to, although conSisting ot 104 actual
members, as mentioned above) had become more tban simply a board
of judges to whom returning generals were accountable; they are
already the ·supreme magistracy". probably exercising a strong
influence over the sutetes, generals, and senators through their
supremacy as arbiters ot otticial conduct at home and in the
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field. We shall see later that this power eventually gave them
the actual control of the city.

--

VI. The Boards ot Five

-

Another feature of the political organization of Carthage,
and one rather closely connected with the Judges in spirit and
function, were the commissions of Five, or Pentarchies, described

Aristotle as an oligarchic element in the Carthaginian
constitution: 38
~

The appointment ~ co-optation of the Boards of Five which
control many important matters, and the election by these
boards of the supreme magistracy of the Hundred, and also their
longer tenure of authority than that of any other officers (for
they are in power after they have ~one out of office and before
they have 8ctually entered upon it) are oligarchical features;
their receiving no pay and not being chosen by lot and other
similar regulations must be set down as aristocratic, and so
must the fact that the members of the Boards are the judges in
all law suits; instead of different suits being tried by different courts, as at Sparta.
This is all we know of the inst'itution from ancient sources t
and the account is none too clear. It is probable that as Carthage grew into an empire under the policy of expansion and
foreign conquest which she undertook to offset the inroads of
the Greeks about the fifth century B.C.

39

the business of gover-

nment became too complex to be handled efficiently by the kings
and council. The Boards of Five would have been instituted as
permanent commissions in charge of ftimportant matters"- milita
and naval affairs, commerce and revenues, colonial administration, and domestic discipline. The commissioners' tenure of office stretched over a long period of time, and this, with the
c

their own members b

was doubt-

10

lesS intended to insure stability and singleness of purpose in
the vital departments of the state. Yet it is this very permanence that Aristotle criticizes as oligarchic, leaving the door
open to abuse. The Boards of Five,

ha~ing

the privilege of

electing the members of the ·supreme magistracy ot the Hundred",
could place men ot their own class and point of view in this
powerful institution also. The fact that the commissioners received no pay, and that they were not chosen by lot, but probablyon the basis of wealth and merit, Aristotle concedea to be
an aristocratic feature, but points out later40that such regulations in practice tend to oligarchy. Finally, he tells us
that the members of these boards were judges in all law suits,a prerogative that could also easily be misused to strengthen
the grip of oligarchy. It has been mentioned that the sutetes
acted as judges in law SUits;41It this is to be reconciled with
Aristotle's statement we must conclude that the sutetes were
ex officio members of the Boards, perhaps the permanent chairmen, much as the vice-presIdent is chairman of the Senate of the
United States.
VII. lB! Assembly
Unusual as it may be in a commonwealth of Eastern or Semetic
origin, there was a popular assembly at Carthage,- a

bij~oG

-

with even greater power than the assembly at Sparta.
The reference of some matters and not of others to the popular assembly rests with the kings in consultation with the
Elders in case they agree unanimously, but failing that, these
matters also lie with the people; and when the kings introduce
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business in the assembly, they do not merely let the people sit
and listen to the decisions that have been taken by their ruler~
but the people have the sovereign decision, and anybody who
wishes may speak against the proposals introduced, a right that
does not exist under the other constitutions.42
This passage proves that in Aristotle's time at least, the
kings could call the assembly and propose measures for consideration. Under these circumstances the people had the right of
debate and their decision was final.
Among the later authors, Polybius relates an incident which
took place toward the end of the Second Punic war, and which
clearly shows that the assembly was still of importance at that
time. After the Carthaginians, by seizing the Roman supply

ship~

had broken the treaty which was supposed to have ended the war,
Scipio sent ambassadors to demand an explanation. Polybius say~~
On arriVing at Carthage they first of all addressed the
senate, and afterwards being brought before the popular assembly
spoke with great freedom about the situation.
After an account of their complaint, he continues:
There were few among the Carthaginians who approved of adhering to the treaty. The majority both of their leading politicians and of those who took part in the deliberation objected
to its harsh conditions, and with difficulty tolerated the bold
language of ~e ambassadors •••• The popular assembly decided simply to dismiss the ambassadors without a reply ••••
Thus it is evident that even at this time, matters of the
greatest importance were put in the hands

of~e

assembly for

deliberation and decision.
But the greatest proof ot the power ot the assembly is the
reform which Hannibal effected through it after the end of the
Second Punic war. Hannibal, being elected sutete, broke the

12

power ot the Judges, who had dominated the Carthaginian state up
to that time. A pretext was given him in the insubordination ot
a quaestor. Livy records the event thus: 44
Hannibal, thinking this conduct highly improper, sent a messenger to arrest the quaestor and haling him betore the assembly
(in contionem), assailed him and not less the order ot Judges.
in comparison with whose pride ot place and power the laws were
as nought. and the magistrates as well. When he saw that his
speech was well received and that their haughty spirits menaced
the liberty ot the lowest classes also, he immediately proposed
and enacted a law that Judges should be elected tor one year
each, and that no one should be a judge tor two consecutive
terms. But whatever influence he gained in this way with the
commons, to the same extent he roused the animOSity ot a large
party among the nobles.
Thus the popular assembly was strong enough under the direction ot Hannibal to overcome the ruling clique by P4ssing a law
directly contrary to their interests,- limiting thier term of
office. In order to appreciate the difficulty, the power involved, it must be remembered that the Judges had made themselves
supreme, torming a narrow oligarchy and strengthening their position through years ot domination.
It is not clear trom the sources whether the assembly was
composed ot all common citizens without discrimination, or
whether some qualitication was necessary. It is likely that in
a city where wealth was an important basis ot distinction, some
property qualification was required tor participation in public
affairs, even in the assembly.45
VIII.

~enerals ~

Minor Qtticials

The last oftice mentioned by Aristotle is that ot general. He
refers to it only incidentally, saying that at Carthage Melect-
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ions are made with an eye to these two qualifications ,wealth
and merit) and especially elections to the most important, those
of the kings and of the genera1s.· 46 All we can gather from this
is that the generalship was an office distinct from that of sufete, unlike the system at Rome, where the consuls were also generals; that the generals were elected; and that they had to be
distinguished for wealth as well as merit.
Among the later writers, Nepos remarks that: 47 ·0n his return
Hannibal was made king after he had been general for twenty-one
years." It is evident from this that the generalship had no fixed term, but continued for the length of the war, or at least
until the general was recalled for mismanagement, or simply
defeat, as many of them were. The Carthaginian generals held
this advantage over the Roman, in that they were not limited by
a fixed term of office, and so eou1d maintain a consistent and
unchanging policy, profiting by experience. The Romans, in
changing generals every two years, were deprived of these advantages.
As we have mentioned (supra V). the generals were responsible
for their conduct, and in fact, for the outcome of their expeditions, to the Board of 100 Judges, and some paid for ill success with their lives. In the field they were supreme; it appears however that they were sometimes accompanied by members of
the senate, who must have had some influence upon their conduct,
probably attending them as advisers. There were fifteen senators
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with Mago when Scipio. defeated him and took New Carthage, accord1ng to Pa1ybius.

48

There were at least two generals in charge ot the armies ot
Carthage. Thus, while Hannibal led one army in Italy, another,
under Hasdrubal, detended Carthage against Scipio. During the
Mercenary War which toll owed the First Punic war Hamilcar and
Hanno both held command. Polybius mentions three generals as
holding command at the same time atter the battle ot Ecnomos in
the First Punic war,- Ham11ear, Bostarus, and Hasdrubal, the son
ot Hanno. 49
There were minar otficials at Carthage mentioned occasionally
by historians, though little is known of their tunctions outside
of what is indicated by their titles. We have mentioned the
Wquaestor w whom Hannibal summoned for insubordination, according
to Livy.50 The quaestors were, probably, on the analogy of the
Roman system, treasury officers and paymasters. Nepos speaks ot
a "praetectus Morum w51 who reproved the great Hamilcar,- an otfic
ial who must have fultilled many ot the functions of the Roman
censor, with powers to supervise public and private conduct in
all citizens, regardless of rank or position.
IX. Conclusion
Such was the 88Beral organization ot the Carthaginian government,. kings,council ot Elders, senate, the Hundred Judges, the
assembly, the Pentarchies, the generals, minor ofticials. the
bare external structure of be constitution, the letter of the
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law,

as we can determine from the ancient sources. It is
this sea¥ral form that Aristotle admires: 5 2
as~r

Carthage also appears to have a good constitution. (And
!urthur:) Many regulations at Carthage are good; and a proof
of a well-regulated constitution is that the populace willingly remain faithful to the constitutional system, and that
neither civil strife bas arisen in any degree worth mentioning, not yet a tyran;.
It is this form which draws from Polybius the comment:

53

The constitution of Carthage seems to me to have been
originally well contrived as regards its most distinctive
features. For there were kings, andthe house of Elders was
an aristocratical force, and the people were supreme in
matters proper to them, the entire frame of the state much
resembling that of Rome and Sparta.
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CHAPTER II
ADHEREN CE TO THE LAW
I. The Problem
It is evident, then, from the testimony ot Aristotle, whom
Smith calls "the greatest political philosopher of antiquity,·l
and of Polybius, whom Duruy terms .the wisest historian of antiquity,.2 that the external structure ot the Carthaginian government as originally planned, was excellent; what we want to
determine next is: How did this constitution work out in practice? What was the spirit animating the corpus of laws? What do
the ancients tell us ot the actual operation ot t be Carthaginian
government under the system proposed by the lawmakers? In other
words, we have seen the Carthaginian system

in~e

abstract; we

must try now to discover hew it was entorced in fact.
II. Detects Mentioned

~

Aristotle

It is important to notice that whereas Aristotle praises the
general structure ot the government ot Carthage, he does not
hesitate to criticize certain elements which he regards as detects, departures

trom~e

aristocratic torm, and sources ot dan-

ger to the state. "The features open to critic1.sm as judged by
the principle ot an aristocracy or republic are
departures

in~e

s~me

of them

direction of democracy and others in the direc-

tion ot oligarchy." 3
The democratic teature criticized is the

import~ce

allowed

to the popular assembly in making it supreme when the kings and

~~

Elders fail to agree, giving it the right of debate and decision
as explained above (Chapter I, section VII).
The oligarchical features oar more numerous: (1) the Pentarchies, (2) venality or plutocracy, (3) official pluralism, and
(4) the reduction of the populace by colonization.
(1) The Pentarchies, or Boards of Five, are dangerous because
while controlling important matters, they elect their own members
by co-optation, enjoying an unusually long term of office, and
~he

privilege of selecting the members of the powerful Board of

Judges.

4

(2) In regard to the"venal or plutocratic tendency, Aristotle
says: 5
But the Carthaginian system diverges from aristocracy in the
direction of oligarchy most signally in respect of a certain idea
that is shared b.Y the mass of mankind; they think that the rulers
should be chosen not only for their merit, but also for their
wealth, as it is not possible for a poor man to govern well or to
have leisure for his duties •••• But it must be held that this
divergence from aristocracy is an error on ~e part of the lawgiverj for one of the most important points to keep in view from
the outset is that the best citizens may be able to haTe leisure,
and may not have to engage in any unseemly occupation, not only
when in office bpt also when living in private life. And if it
is necessary to look to the question of means for the sake of
leisure, it is a bad thing that the greatest offices of the stat~
the kingship and the generalship, should be for sale. For this
law makes wealth more honored than worth, and renders the whole
state avaricious; and whatever the holders of supreme power deem
honorable, the opinion of the other citizens also is certain to
follow them, and a state in which virtue is not held in the highest honor cannot be securely governed by an aristocracy. And it
is probable that those who purchase offioe will learn by degrees
to amke a profit out of it when they hold office for money spent.
(3) The feature most characteristically oligarchical, however,
is the union of a number of distinct offices and powers in one

person,- official pluralism: 6
And it might also be though a bad thing for the same person
to hold several offices, which is considered a distinction at
carthage. One man one 30b is the best rule for efficiency, and
the lawgiver ought to see- that this may be secured and not
appoint the same men to play the flute and make shoes.
(4) Finally, the rulers at Carthage were accustomed to rid
themselves of truublesome surplus population among the lower
classes by an expedient which Aristotle regards as dangerous:

7

But the constitution being oligarchical they best escape the
dangers by being wealthy, as they constantly send out a portion
of the common people to appointments in theicities (colonies);
by this means they heal the social sore and make the constitutio
stable. However, this is the achievement of fortune, whereas
freedom from civil strife ought to be secured by the lawgiver;
but as it is, suppose some misfortune occurs and the multitude
at subject class revolts, there is no remedy provided by the
laws to restore tranquillity.
These five defects, then, were already evident in Aristotle's
time. It is clear that they are not simply theoretical objections, based on an analysis ot the constitution in the abstract.
At least venality, pluralism, and the colonizing device are not
regarded as merely possible dangers, but because they are !!!a

12 exist the constitution is criticized for not providing against
them. Theretore the detects mentioned by Aristotle must have bee
actual dangerous tendencies in the operation of the Carthaginian
government under the oonstitution.
III. During.!!!.! First Punic War
A period of more than fifty years elapsed between Aristotle's
death and t he First Punic war, during which we have no record of
the political developement of Carthage. A few indications can be

-
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gathered, however, from Polybius' account. He speaks only once

0

the conai tion of the state, and that is to say only that: tiThe
two states (Rome and Carthage) were also at this period still uncorrupted in principle, moderate in fortune, and equal in
strength. t1B All further evidence must be gathered by inference.
In relating the opening incident, the Roman occupation of
Messene, Polybius says:9
The Mamertines, partly by menace and partly by stratagem, dislodged the Carthaginian commander, who was already established
in the citadel, and then invited Appius to enter, placing the
city in his hands. The Carthaginians crucified their general,
thinking him guilty of a lack both of judgment and of courage in
abandoning the citadel •.
Another commander, Hannibal (not the Great), later suffered
the same fate: "Not long afterwards he was blockaded in one of
the harbors of Sardinia by the Romans and after losing many of
his ships was summarily arrested by the surviving Carthaginians
and crucified. H10
This was, as is evident, the customary way of dealing with
unsuccessful generals at Carthage. Since they were responsible
to the Board of 100 Judges, the punishment, no doubt, was meted
out by this group. They were traditionally cruel, though probablJ
not so blindly severe as Valerius Maximus pictures them. After
speaking of the rigor of Roman discipline, he says:ll
Lenlter hoc, patres conscripti, si Carthaginiensium senatu8
in militiae negotlis procurand1s v1olent1am intueri velimus; a
quo duces bella pravo consilio gerentes, etiamsi prospera fortuna subsequuta esset, cruci tamen sufflgebantur; quod bene
gesserant deorum immortalium adjutorio, quod male commiserant,
lpsorum culpae imputantes.
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In general, the practice shows the power of the order of
Judges, their interest in resulta above all else, and their
oruelty.
It is likely, too, that they used this cruel power to gain
their own ends within the state. There is an instance of this
related by Justinus 12 as taking place even in the time of Aristotle (circa 328 Be), while the government of Carthage was still
relatively pure and uncorrupted. A certain Hamilear Rhodanus,
"vir solertia faeundiaque praeter eaeteros ins ignis ," was sent
as a spy to the court of Alexander the Great. He fulfilled his
mission with extraordinary success, yet, according to Justinus,
"Carthaginienses post mortem regis (Alexander) reversum in patrlam, quasi urbem regi venditass.t, non ingrato tantum, verum
etiam invido et crudeli animo, necaverunt." No doubt his success
and abilities were a threat to the ambition of

~he

wealthy class,

embodied in the Board of Judges. It must have been through the
exercise of their power in this manner that they eventually became the real directing power of the state, usurping the rights
of the senate and controlling the magistrates through fear, as
Livy relates. l3
There is another characteristic evident in the operation of
the Carthaginian government during the first Punic war whicb was
much more important in effect ing tbe final resul t--their shortSighted commercial attitude. The Carthaginians w.ere clearly led
by the blindness of aVarice into mistakes wbich not only cost
them the

but kindled th
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~

volt--the acrnovvov

~

nO~E~ov--which

followed it. These mistake.

were 1) the oppression of subject states, 2) the neglect of
their fleet, and 3) the treatment of their mercenary army after
the war.
The Romans gained their first real footing in Sicily not
simply because they took Messene, but because their forces were
joined and supported by the people of the island. Polybius
says: "On their arrival in Sicily, most of the cities revolted
14
from the Carthaginians and Syracusans and joined the Romans."
Again, when the Romans landed for the first time in Africa
the native Numidians seized the opportunity to revolt and joined them against the Carthaginians: "In addition to the misfortunes I have mentioned, the Numidians attacking them at the same
time as the Romans, inflicted not less but even more dam_ge on
the country than the latter.- 15
Why should the states and peoples subject to Carthage be so
ready to revolt, to join the invader against her, if not for the
same reason that the Libyans rushed to support the mercenariea
in the bloody insurrection that followed the war? Polybius tells
us that the Carthaginians -had chiefly themselves to thank for
all these grievous mischances," and explains as follows: 16
During the former war they had thought themselves reasonably
justified in making their government of the Libyans very harsh.
They had exacted from the peasantry, without exception, half of
their crops, and had doubled the taxation of the townsmen without allowing exemption from any tax or even a partial abatement
to the poor. They had applauded and honored not those governors
who treated the people with gentleness and humanity, but those
who procured for Oarthage the largest amount of supplies and
stores and used the country people most harshly •••• The conse-
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quence waS that the male population requi red no incitement to
revolt,--a mere mel.age Was sufticient--wh.ile the women, who
bad constantly witnessed the arrest of their husbands and
fathers for non-payment of taxes, solemnly bound themselves by
oatb in each city to conceal none of their belongings, and strip
ping themselves of their jewels contributed them ungrudgingly to
tbe war fund.
Thus, the revolts amons subject nations may well be .ttributed to a barsh. colonial policy, dictated by the avaricious desire of the Carthaginian government to throw the financial burden of the war on them rather than carrying it herself as Rome
did.
Secondly, this same blind commercial outlook betraTed Carthage into the error that actually lost the war for her in the
naval battle near the island of Aegusa, off Lilybaeum. The Romans had been driven from the sea twioe already, their fleet
shattered. "It was yield1ng to the blowa of Fortune that they
bad retired from the sea on the first occasion; the second time
it was owing to their defeat at Drepana, but now they made

th~

tbird attempt, and through it, by gaining a viotory and outting
off the supplies from the sea of the Carthaginian army
they put an end to the whole war.· 17

a~

Eryx,

Why was Carthage defeated at sea in this deoisive ba·ttle? (1)

She failed to estimate correctly the spirit of her opponent and
(2) she neglected her own fleet. Polybius explains thus: 18
Their ships, being loaded, were not in a serviceable oondition for battle, while the crews were quite untrained, and had
been put on board for the emergenoy and their marines were ree ent levies, whose first experience of the least hardship and
danger tb.is waa. The fact is that, owing to their never having
expeoted the Romans to d1spute the sea w.ith them, they had, in
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contempt for them, neglected their own navy.
Those who governed Carthage judged the Roman spirit by their
0.0

materialist standards; it was only ·sound business sense"

to economize by cutting down on naval expenditures after the
second Roman failure. Their economy cost them the war.
Finally, this same attitude brought on t he mercenary revolt.
After peace was made, the mercenary troops were shipped by their
generals in contingents to Carthage for payment and quiet demobilization. The government of Carthage, however, allowed them
to gather

in~e

city, hoping that when all were assembled they

might be persuaded to forego some of the wages due them, as
Polybius points out: 19 "The Carthaginians partly because, owing
to their recent outlay, they were not very well off for money,
and partly because they were convinced that the mercenaries,
would let them off part of t heir arrears of pay, once they got
them all collect.ed in Carthage, detained them there on their
arrival in t.his hope, confining them

t.o~e

city.-

Among such a veteran soldiery, many of them half barbarian,
all of them confident

in~eir

prowess after years of campaigning

few of them having any personal attachment to Cart.hage, the
proposed reduction of wages for services already rendered could
not but fan the spark of discontent into the roaring conflag";'
ration of revolt. The devastating war that followed could have
been prevented had the Carthaginian government been willing to
pay her soldiers the wages she had promised. It was not that
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Carthage lacked the wealth, though she was hard pressed and
would have had to make sacrifices. The wealth must have been
there, since later, when threatened with revolt, the government
agreed to pay even more than the soldiers originally demanded,
and actually sent their general Gesco with money to discharge
the arrears; but the affair had gone too far; Gesco and the
money were seized and the mutiny became civil war. 20
These three

gre~t

disasters,- the revolt of the subject

states, the decisive naval defeat off Aegusa, and the outbreak
of the "war without truce"- are all traceable to the myopic policy of an avaricious commercialism, a characteristic of the government of Carthage which indicates clearly that at this time
she must have been dominated by the wealthy class,. an inevitabl
consequence of the oligarchic tendencies descr1bed by Aristotle.
Finally, it should be pointed out that along with its shortcomings tha Carthaginian senate was also capable of genuine
courage in the face of destruction. Defeated and almost in the

.

hands of the Roman general Regulus, they sent ambassadors to ask
for terms. Regulus dealt w1th them in a high handed manner, pro21
posing conditions of extreme severity. In the words of Polybius:
"The attitude of the Carthaginian senate on hearing the Roman
general's proposals was, although they had almost abandoned all
hope of safety, yet one of such manly dignity that rather than
submit to anything ignoble or unworthy of their past they were
Willing to suffer anything and to face every exertion and every
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extremity."
From Polybius' acoount of the First Punic war, then, we can
conclude that the operation of the Carthaginian government was
marked at times by oruelty, by oppression and neglect springing
from the blindness of avarice, wbiob cost Carthage not only the
war, but the mercenary rebellion that followed. It must not be
supposed that the Carthaginians were incapable of acting otherwise, as the incident of their opposition to Regulus olearly
shows; nor were their counsels always rash ana their plans importunate, 'or t hey would never have been a match for Rome; further, they could produce a great leader like Hasarubal, utterly
selfless in devotion to his country, surpassing any Roman in his
skill as a general; yet the fact is that Carthage did fail, and
her failure may be attributed

to~e

defects mentioned, since

they undermined the structure of her government, kindling the
hatred of her allies, arousing the hopes, and the contempt,of
Rome.
IV. During the Second Punic

~

For the period of the Second Punic war, there is no need to
determine the characteristic operation of the Carthaginian government by inference, since both Polybius and Livy have left
enlightening generalizations on

~e

matter. First of all, both

agree that the government of Carthage underwent a ohange, that
t.he old oonstitution no .. longer operated in its purity, that
abuses had broken down the balance between the various depart-
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.en ts of the original aristocracy. Polybius specifically mentions this change, its nature and causes. After praising the
original constitution, he says:22
But at the time when they entered on be Hannibalic war, the
Carthaginian constitution had degenerated, and that of Rome was
better. For as every body or state or action has its natural
periods first of growth, then of prime, and finally of decay,
and as every thing in them is at its best when they are in their
prime, it was for this reason that the difference between the
two state. manifested itself at this time. For by as much as the
power and prosperity of Carthage had been earlier than that of
Rome, by so much had Carthage already begun to decline; while
Rome was exactly at her prime, as far, at least, as her system
of government was concerned. ConsequentlY the multitude at Carthage bad already acquired the cbief voice in deliberations;
while at Rome the senate still retained this; and hence, as in
one case the masses deliberated and in the other tbe most eminent men, the Roman decisions on public affairs were superior,
so that although they met with complete disaster, they were
tinally, by the wisdom of their counsels, victorious over the
Carthaginians in war.
There is no doubt of t he fact of the change; as to t he nature,
Polybius held that it was in

t

he direction of democ racy, that

the old aristocracy had given way in the time of the Hannibalic
war to something like mob rule. Livy,
mention the fact

of~e

on~e

other hand, does not

change specifically; rather it is implied

in his summary of the situation immediately after t he Sec ond
Punic war, when he describes the reforms instituted by Hannibar~
The order of Judges at that time was in control in Carthage,
principally because the same men were judges for life. The property, reputation, and life of every citizen were in t heir hands.
A man who offended one of the Judges made enemies of them all,
nor was there any lack of persons to bring accusations before
hostile Judges. Under their adminstration, marked by such violence,- for they did not use their excessive wealth in the spiri
of a free state- Hannibal had been elected praetor.
The reforms instituted by Hannibal cast light on the conditio
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of the government during this period. These reforms were aimed
at what Hannibal, unquestionably sincere in his desire for the
good of his native city, evidently regarded as the greatest
detects in her administration. The first reform was an attempt
to restore the balance of power: 24HW hen he saw ••• that their (the
Judges') baughty spirits menaced the liberty of the lowest
classes also, he immediately proposed and enacted a law, that
Judges should be elected for one year each, and that no one
should be a Judge for two consecutive terms.These two passages clearly indicate Livy's opinion as to the
oligarchic nature of the change. From both Livy and Polybius
then this much at least is clear,- (1) that a change trom the
original constitution had taken place in the Carthaginian government, and (2) that the change was tor the worse, though the
sources apparently disagree concerning its nature.
It is possible, despite the apparent contradiction of the two
accounts, that both may be right, the difference lying in the
point of view. Livy says that the Judges held supreme power;
Polybius claims that the people prevailed. We have seen that the
dangerous tendencies noted by Aristotle were both democratic and
oligarchic. 25 It is probable that in a time of stress like the
period of the Punic wars, these elements would grow, upsetting
the balance of the original constitutional torm, each striving
for domination. Both Livy and Polybius agree on the fact of the
change trom the old form. They differ on the direction it took.
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Polybius, speaking of the principles of political evolution
in the sixth book, says: 26ftAristocracy by its very nature degenerates into oligarchy; and when the commons, inflamed by anger
take vengeance on this government for its unjust rule, democracy
comes into being." This may well have been the case at Carthage.
The original aristocracy would have changed to oligarchy through
the tendencies noted by Aristotle. Through the Pentarchies, official pluralism, venality, and power to crush opposition by the
abUse of their cruel prerogative, the Judges would have gathered
everything into their own hands.
On the other hand, because of the expense involved and the
insecurity of war times, the otficial colonizing expeditions,the "safety valve" device mentioned by Aristotle tor ridding
the city of troublesome excess population- were probably discontinued, so that the lower classes ,swelled by natural increase
and joined by numbers of rural workers who tlocked to the city
for protection t must have offered an increasing threat to the
oligarchy, eventually becoming its rival for power.
The struggle between these two would explain Livy's account
of the tyrannical measures employed by the oligarchs against
individuals. They would have been drtten to such measures to
maintain their position. This opposition also explains Polybius t
remark about the increased importance of the multitude in the
affairs of state, for the oligarchs, fearing a general uprising,
Would have been forced to allow the people to decide in matters
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that concerned them intimately, as in the case of the renewal
of the Second Punic war after the treaty with Scipio had been
broken.

27

The final victory of the assembly under Hannibal, as Livy
relates, would end the struggle by breaking the power of the
Judges, and Polyblus' principle would be fulfilled: • ••• and
when the commons, enflamed by anger. take vengeance on this government tor its unjust rule, democracy comes into being." Thus
Livy and Polybius, apparently contradicting each other, would
both be right.
In regard to a second great weakness in the operation of the
government at this time, it will help to recall that Aristotle,
noting dangerous tendencies in his own time, criticizes the law
which made wealth as well as merit, a basis of preferment: 28ft For
this law makes wealth more honored than worth, and renders the
whole state avaricious •••• And it is probable that those who
purchase office will learn by degrees to make a profit out of it
when they hold office for money spent."
That Aristotle's sage prediction was borne out in fact in the
subsequent history of Carthage is proved by the testimony of
both Livy and Polybius. In tracing the causes of Rome's final
Victory in the Second Punic war, Polybius says:29
Again, the laws and customs relating to the acquisition at
wealth are better in Rome than at Carthage. At Carthage nothing
which results in profit is regarded as disgraceful; at Rome,
nothing is considered more so than to accept bribes and seek
gain from improper channels •••• A proof at this is that at Carthage candidates tor oftice practice open bribery, whereas at
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Rome death is the penalty for it.
Livyfs account of the second great reform of Hannibal is
proof that at Carthage those who had "purchased office had learn
ad by degrees to make a profit out of it":30
Moreover, by another act he served the public interest, but
aroused personal enmities against himself. The public revenues
were being partly wasted through carelessness, partly appropriated as their booty and spoils of office by some of the prominent men and magistrates, and money to pay the tribute to the
Romans each successive year was laoking, and a heavy assessment
seemed to threaten the oitizens.
When Hannibal had investigated the revenues, how much was
colleoted as taxes on land and as duty at the ports, for what
purpose it Was spent, how much the ordinary expenses of the
state required, and how much embezzlement took form the treasury
he asserted in the assembly that the state would be rich enough,
1f it collected the revenues not otherwise used and omitted the
assessment on individual oitizens, to pay its debt to the Romans
and this assertion he was able to make good.
But now the men whom embezzlement from the treasury had maintained for many years, as if they were being robbed of their
property instead of being made to give up the profits of their
thefts, in passion and anger tried to bring upon Hannibal the
wrath of the Romans.
The abuse was evidently of long standing if there were "'men
whom embezzlement from the treasury had maintained for many
years." Some estimate of "how much embezzJ.ement took from the
treas~y"

may be gathered from the fact that in 191 B.C. the

Carthaginians offered to pay up in a lump sum the remainder of
the ten thousand talent indemnity imposed upon them by the Romans as one of the conditions of peace in 202 B.C •• This means
that by stopping the embezzlement of public funds through the
Hannibalic reform the government was able to save ten thousand
talents in about ten years, one-fifth of the time allowed them
by the treaty.31
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That the government of Carthage, then, had degenerated from
the original well-balanced aristocratic form and that it was
undermined by venality,- bribery and embezzlement- both Polybius
and Livy agree. Polybius mentions several more weaknesses in the
carthaginian system, as further reasons for Rome's final victory. Among them is the utter dependence of Carthage on mercenary troops,- a practice consistent with the commeroial character
of the city. After speaking of the Carthaginian superiority at
sea, Polybius continues: 32
But as regards military service on land the Romans are much
more efficient, They indeed devote their whole energies to this
matter, whereas the Carthaginians entirely neglect their infantry, though they do pay some slight attention to their cavalry.
The reason of this is that the troops they employ are foreign
and meroenary, whereas those of the Romans are natives of the
soil and oitizens. So that in this respeot also we must pronounce the politioal system of Rome to be superior to that of
Carthage, the Carthaginians oontinuing to depend for the maintenance of their freedom on the courage of a meroenary foroe,
but the Romans on their own valor and on the aid of their allies
Though the employment of mercenaries may not be a defect in
government as such, still it indicates the materialistic character of the Carthaginian state, whioh sought to win its wars
through wealth rather than through the moral vigor, the courage
and patriotism, of its citizens. It is this lack of moral vigor,
arising from the failure of the Carthaginians to foster public
spirit and the manly virtues, that Polybius mentions as another
33
of the causes of their final defeat.
Fiaally, he attributes
Rome's success in great part to her marked superiority in matters of religion: 34 "But the quality in which the Roman commonwealth is most distinctly superior is in my opinion the nature
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of their religious convictions." However, the discussion of
theSe last two important points,- national ideals and religionpertains rather to the moral culture of Carthage and will be
oonsidered later.
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These passages, then, from the most reliable historians of
the Second Punic war, give sufficient testimony to the fact tha
at this period the operation of the government at Carthage had
fallen away from the provisions of the original constitution;
that it was corrupted by wholesale bribery on the part of candi
dates, who reimbUBsed themselves from the public funds after
their appointment to office; that it Was characterized by the
mercenary spirit and its corresponding weakness in moral fibre.

v.

During the Third Punic War

As sources of our knowledge of the Third Punic war, Livy and
Polybius are found to be of less value than the late Roman historian Appian, who, in the portion of his history of Rome dedicated to the Punic wars, has left us the only detailed account
of the final struggle which ended with the destruction of Carthage. 36 Polybius' account is sketchy and fragmentary; Livy's
has survived only through the epitome. Appian, though late (951
165 A,D.), had the best sources at his disposal add is as dependable as any of the historians of his time. His account, how
ever, affords only occasional glimpses of the working of the
Carthaginian government during this period, and we shall have
to rely upon inference, as in the case of the First Punic war,
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rather than direot testimony.
Aooording to this method, form the aooounts of Appian, Livy,
and Polybius, two main oonolusions oan be drawn oonoerning the
government of Carthage at this period. The first is that the
original oonstitutional form still existed, and seoond, that
the operation of the government was rendered unstable by faotional strife, partioularily by the interferenoe of the multitudes. Finally, in the last oritioal moments, a<tyranny was
established and under it the oity was destroyed.
How do we know that the old oonstitutional form was maintained? The evidenoe is not oomplete; there is, for example, no mention in the souroes of the sufetes or of the judges as suoh.
still, there is evidenoe to show that the senate, the Gerousia,
and the assembly were still distinguished, and that the principle business of the state was still carried on through their
ageno¥ up until the establishment of the tyranny.
It was the ~arthaginian senate, for example, that deoided to
make terms after Rome had deolared war. Polybius testifies to
this:
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"After a long seoret disoussion in the

[>

senate they

appointed plenipotentiaries and sent them to Roma with instruotions to do whatever they thought was in the interest of their
oountry under the present ciroumstanoes." And the epitome of
Livy fills in a significant detail: 38 "Deleotique sunt ex primoribue triginta, quibuslibet oonditionibus paoem impetraturi."
From these two passages it is evident that the senate and the
Gerousia were still funotioning, the senate as a real agency of
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government, the Gerousia (delecti triginta)39at least as a diplomatic unit. This is further supported by the distinction incorporated in the Roman demand for "three hundred hostages, sons
of senators or of members of the uerousia. n40
Then, even after the popular tumult that followed the announ
cement of Rome's determination to raze the city, the senate sti
retained and exercised the prerogatives of government: 4l
The same day the Carthaginian senate declared war and proclaimed freedom to the slaves. They also chose generals and selected Hasdrubal for the outside works, whom they had condemned
to death, and who had already collected 30,000 men •••• Within
the walls they chose for general another Hasdrubal, the son of
a daughter of Masinissa. They also sent to the consuls asking
a truce of thirty days in order to send an embassy to Rome.
Despite the survival of the ancient constitutional form and
the recognized authority of the senate, there could have been
little internal tranquillity or stability of policy in Carthage
at this time, for the city was racked with factional strife.
During the fifty years of comparative peace preceding the Third
Punic war, th8ee groups formed in the city:42
Very soon (as frequently happens in periods of prosperity)
factions arose. There was a Roman party, a democratic party,
and a party Which favored Masinissa. Each had leaders of eminent reputation and bravery. Hanno the Great was the leader of
the Romanizing faction; Hannibal, surnamed the starling, was
the chief of those who favored Masinissa; and Hamilcar, surnamed the Samnite, and Carthalo, of the democrats.
It was the rash action of the democratic faction which actually precipitated the Third Punic war. First they stirred up
43
trouble with Rome's Numidian ally, Masinissa:
"The latter
party, watching their opportunity ••• persuaded Carthalo ••• to
attack the subjects of Masinissa, who were encamped on disputed
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territory." The incident made Rome determine to take up arms
once more against Carthage. A second incident which took place
a feW years later brought on war with Masinissa, and gave Rome
the eXCuse she needed to interfere. Again, factional disturbances in the city were at the basis of the trouble, and this
time, too, the democratic group was responsible: 44
The democratic faction in Carthage drove out the leaders of
the party favoring Masinissa, to the number of about forty, and
alsO cartied a vote of banishment and made the people swear that
they should never be taken back, and that the question of taking
them back should never be discussed. The banished men took refuge with Masinissa and urged him to declare war.
The Numidian king sent his sons to intercede; the sons were
shut out of the city by Carthalo, the democratic leader; one or
them was attacked on the return journey; and Masinissa opened
the war by seizing a town allied to Carthage. Thus the action
of the democratic group began the war Which resulted in the destruction of the city.
There are evidences of popular violence all through the aooount of this period. The multitudes in the city must have been
a force to reckon with; they apparently not only interfered in
the government, but took it into their own hands when aroused.
We have but to consider their treatment of the state officials
after the announcement of Rome's determination to raze the oity
to realize how unoontrollable the people were, and consequently
how great their influence through fear must have been upon those
who conducted the government after that time:
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Some fell upon those senators who had advised giving the hostages and tore them in pieces, considering them the ones who had
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them into the trap. Others treated in a similar way those
l.d had favored giving up the arms. Some stoned the ambassadors
~~~ bringing the bad news, and others dragged them through the
cityAs might be expeoted, this same spirit of violenoe broke out
later in the assembly itself; it is surprising, however, and indicative of their oharaoter, to find it appearing at a time when
the Carthaginians were elated by suooess and confident of victory, rather than reduced to desperation as on the occasion just
mentioned: 46
Being now armed, their designs grew unbounded, and they gain.d in confidenoe, oourage, and resouroes from day to day. Hasdrubal, who oommanded in the oountry and had twioe got the better of Manilius, was also in high spirits. Aspiring to the oommand in the city, whioh was held by another Hasdrubal, a nephew
of Galussa, he aocused the latter of an intention to betray Carthage to Galussa. This acousation being brought forth in the
assembly, and the acoused being at a loss to answer the unexpected oharge, they fell upon him and beat him to death with the
benches.
It appears, then, from these passages that the government of
Carthage at this time was oharacterized by factional strife and
violent outbreaks among the populaoe. This does not mean, however, that throughout the period the multitudes held uninterrupted supremacy. The demooratio faction had involved the oity
in war with Masinissa, as has been shown. But after the Carthaginian foroes had been defeated and Rome intervened, the proRoman faotion, probably the nobles and rioh merchants who desired peaoe, must have gained the upper hand, for (1) the demooratio leaders were oondemned to death,47and (2) great efforts
were made to conoiliate Rome, involving the surrender of three
hundred hostages and all the oity's vast store of armaments. 48
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go«ever,

af~er

Rome's final demand for the destruction of the

oity, and the wild demonstration that followed, the pro-Roman
faotion fell, Hasdrubal was reinstated, and the people, infuriated against Rome, resolved to resist. The government at that
time must have passed largely into their hands, though the traditional form was retained.
In the ninth book of the Republic Plato traces the natural
developement of governments through a series of stages,- aristooracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. The
theory appears to be borne out by the history of Carthage. Considering the time of the

Thir~

Punic war as the change to the

democratic phase, during which the government of Carthage was
influenced more than ever before by the multitudes, as has been
shown, we find the theory fulfilled, the wheel turned full cycle
with the establishment of the tyranny of Hasdruba1 shortly befor
the final seige and destruction. His rise to power can be traced
through the passages already quoted from Appian. He led the Carthaginian forces in the democratic-instigated war against Masinissa, and after being defeated, was condemned to death;
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he

escaped, gathered an army, and after Carthage declared war, was
reinstated as general outside the city;

50

after defeating the

Romans twice, in a moment of popular favor he brought false char
ges against his namesake and colleague within the City, stirred
up the people to kill him, and thus established his own supremacy.51 He openly assumed the role of tyrant after the capture
of Megara by Scipio: 52
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When daylight came, Hasdrubal, enraged at the attack on Megara, took the Roman prisoners whom he held, brought them upon
the walls in full sight of their comrades, and tore out their
eyes, •••• He intended to make reconciliation between the Carthalnians and Romans impossible, and sought to fire them with the
~onviction that their only sagety was in fighting; but the result was contrary to his intention. For the Carthaginians, conscience-stricken by these nefarious deeds, became timid instead
of courageous, and hated Hasdrubal for depriving them even of
all hope of pardon. Their senate especially denounced him for
committing these savage and outrageous cruelties in the midst
of such great domestic calamities. But he actually arrested
some of the oomplaining senators and put them to death. Making
himself feared in every way, he came to be more like a tyrant
than a general, for he considered himself secure only if he
were an object of terror to them, and for this reason difficult
to attack.
Hasdrubal had all the characteristics of the Platonic tyrant,
and in their last days the Carthaginians, hemmed in on all sides
by

the Romans, were reduced to utter misery by his ruthless dom5

ination. Polybius describes the tyrant and his brief reign thus:
"Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian general, was an empty-headed braggart and very far from being a competent statesman or general. a
This is followed by an aocount of Hasdrubal's stupid attempt to

obtain the city's freedom by negotiating with Scipio, even after
his horrible cruelty to the Roman prisoners, and when Carthage
was already doomed. Polybius continues:
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When we look at his utteranoew we admire the man and his
high-souled words, but when we turn to his actual begavior, we
are amazed by his ignobility and cowardice. For, to begin with,
when the rest of the citiZens were utterly perishing from famine, he gave drinking parties and offered his guests sumptuous
second courses and by his own good cheer exposed the general
distress. For the number of deaths was incredibly large and so
Was the number of daily desertions due to famine. And next by
making mock of some and inflicting outrage and death on others
he terrorized the populace and maintained his authority in his
sorely striken country by means to which a tyrant in a prosperous city would scarcely resort.
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Such was the state of the government of Carthage at her de.truction, the old constitution suspended. all power gathered

into the hand of the tyrant. Faotional strife had led to popu-

lar interference and mob violence; the multitudes had raised
.p and encouraged their champion; wi th their help he had clear-

.d away his rivals; and finally, taking over the government him
•• If, became the oppressor of those who had brought him to }:-:
power.
VI. Conclusion
Our purpose is to determine as .est we can from the original

sources the charaoter of the Carthaginians,- their oivilization
and culture- at the time of the Punic W&rs. How has the dis-

oussion just oonoluded furthered this purpose' What light does
the material presented oast upon the Carthaginain charaoter?

w.

have shown Carthage in her oivil aspeot.- her basic syst. .

of government and the operation of that government during the
Punic wars. What conclusions can we draw now in regard to the
civil character of Carthage'
The first is that the ancients agree in praiSing the original oonstitution of Carthage as being· well contrived, showing
extraordinary politioal w!sdom. as evidenced by the statements
of Aristotle and Polybius. The best proof of its exoellenoe is
that this constitution was never overthrown, but remained, at
least nominally, in force until the fall of the oity.
Then. what of the operation of the Carthaginian government
under this oonsti tution? We have seen that even in the::.time of
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Aristotle certain defects began to appear; that these are confirmed by the inferences drawn from Polybius' account of the
First Punic war; that both Livy and Polybius bear witness to
the growth of these defects, and of others, during the second
war; and that Appian widens the breach between the law and its
proper operation by giving evidence of factional strife and
popular interference in government, ending in tyranny and a suspension of the law at the end of the Third Punic war. Thus,
while the law itself was excellent, its effective operation was
inhibited by defects and abuses springing from the national
character. Carthage was like a man dominated and torn by unruly
passions, knowing the right course of action, yet too weak mODally to carry it out.
What were these defects and abuses? They may be roughly classified as: (1) Venality, springing from the commercial character
of her civilization, making wtealth the object of national desire, undermining the government by bribery and embezzlement,
transforming the original well balanced constitution into oligarchy, dictating short-sighted and avaricious policies, such
as the false economy on naval upkeep, and the attempt to deprive
the army of its promised wages at the end of the First Punic war
(2) A certain heartlessness and cruelty accompanied the spirit
of venality at Carthage, as manifested in the treatment of her
generals, her subject states, her public servants. (3) Factiousness in intermal affairs may also be related to the venal character of Carthaginian civilization, for with wealth exalted by
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55
toe constitution itself, virtue and honor lost their supremacy
and the nation was deprived of the strongest moral bond. Jeal-

ousy and strife arose between classes and disturbed the operation of government, apparently growing in intensity until the
final tyranny suppressed all freedom. Justinus bears evidence
56
to this trait when he characterizes Carthage thus: "Condita est
urbs haec LXXXII annis antequam Roma; cUius virtus slcut bello
clara fuit, ita domi status variis discordiarum casibus agitatus
est." (4) Finally, expediency, rather than principle, was the
Carthaginian standard of policy in their external relations with
other peoples. Illustrations are frequent,- the violation of the
first treaty with Scipio toward the end of the first war, their
treatment of allies during the second, and of their troops at
its end, and the initial action against Massinissa leading up
to the third. It was this lack of principle that gained Carthage
her reputation for faithlessness, so that ·Punica fides" became
a synonym for treachery.
These were, in genBral, the defects which appeared in the
operation of the government at Carthage; they were weaknesses
that undermined her own civilization and kindled the hatred of
Rome. But it would be foolish to suppose that Carthage did not
have extraordinary talents as well; otherwise she could never
have established harself as mistress of the seas, nor have resisted Rome as she did. The Romans themselves were not the last
to recognize this; Appian tells of the wild rejoicings of the
people of Rome at the fall of Carthage, for "they knew no other
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war whioh had so terrified them at their own gates as the Punio
wars, which ever brought peril to them by reason of the perseveranoe, high spirit, and courage, as well as the bad faith, of
those enemies. n57 And Cicero, in a fragment from the De Republio a , says:58"Nor could Carthage have prospered so greatly for

~

about six hundred years without good counsel and strict training
(Sine consiliis et disoiplina)."
The strong qualities of the national character of Carthage,
so far as we have seen, are mainly:
(1) A remarkable cleverness, shrewdness, the kind of wisdom
that brings preeminenoe in oommeroe, but 1s distinguished from
wisdom in the fullest sense by a lack of comprehensiveness and
absolute standards. The lim1tations have been shown in several
Instances,- the negleot of the fleet and the treatment of allies
and mercenaries, for example. The wisdom of Carthage was that of
a man of affairs, the wisdoa of expediency, of olever devioes
and practical measures; yet it was capable of producing the constitution so admired by Aristotle; it succeeded in establishing
a commeroial empire never before equalled; it kept the state
intaot through oenturies, in spite of turbulent elements within
and the assaults of powerful enemies from without.
(2) Courage was the second strong element in the Carthaginian
character, a courage whioh, fDom the ancient sources, seems born
of recklessness or desperation, rather than high resolve and
noble principle. It is the unpredictable courage that provoked
the raids on Masinissa, then, as rapidly as it had risen, gave
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way to the point of surrendering arms and hostages, and as suddenly flaring up again when all seemed lost, shut the gates in
the face of the conqueror, resisting with a frenzy and a power
that left the Romans stunned and incredulous even after they had
triumphed:
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They were so excited over this victory that they could hardly
believe it, and they asked each other over and over again whether it was really true that Carthage was destroyed. And so they
conversed the whole night, telling how the arms of the Carthaginians had been taken away from them, and how at onoe, contrary
to expeotation, they supplied themselves with others; how they
lost their ships and built a great fleet out of old material;
boW the mouth of their harbor was closed, yet they managed to
open another in a few days.
Brilliant oourage it was, but fickle, and ultimately ineffeotive against the solid, dogged determination of Rome.
Nations, like men, are rarely preeminently good or utterly
depraved, and character must be judged on broad lines by oonsidering the combination of good and bad which constitute it.
To attempt to formulate in a sentence the character of a nation
is difficult and dangerous at the least. Yet, from such testimony as we have seen, we may hazard the conolusion that the
civil character of Carthage was shrewd and powerful, but defective in the higher qualities associated with the best civilization,- magnanimity, humaneness, unity of spirit and integrity
of principle.
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PART TWO

CULTURE

CHAPTER III
MATERIAL CULTURE

I. Introduction
Civilization, as we have described it in the opening chapter, concerns the "reign of social law,"- the government of Cartnage, its form and operation; all the other elements which went
to make Carthage what she was may be grouped under the general
II

term "culture", divided into material, intellectual, and moral
....

culture. In the state as it exists there is, of course, a mutual
dependence between civilization and culture. A people must possesS a certain minimum of material, intellectual, and moral culture before they can establish the "reign of social law," before
they can form a civilization at all. But granted that the state
be actually established, its subsequent history will be shaped
by the mutual interplay of civil and cultural influences, one
affecting the other. Thus cultural changes will show themselves
in the government, and likewise the vicissitudes of government
will react in the sphere of material, intellectual, and moral
culture. Whatever we know ot one, therefore, must cast light
upon the other, helping us to trace the development and character of the social organism of which they are the elements.
In the first part we have attempted to reconstruct the picture of Carthaginian civilization,- the law and its operationat the time of the Punic wars particularily. It remains to cloth
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these dry bones with the flesh of culture by describing, as well
as weaan from the limited information of the ancient sources,
the material, intellectual, and moral development of Carthage
.1th special reference to this period. In the process it is to
be hoped that light may be cast upon doubtful periods of civil
development by the study of the cultural aspect, that inferences

and conclusions in one sphere may be tested by knowledge which
the other supplies, that the civil and oultural aspects may combine to form an integrated view of the nature of Carthage at the
time of the Punio wars.
II. Description

£f

~

City

Carthage was the richest oity of the ancient world. Yet, when
we try to picture how she must have appeared in the days of her
prosperity our sources leave muoh to be desired. They are far
too meager to permit our traoing the external growth of the

dit~

and at best afford but a rough sketoh in broad outlines. Yet in
this sketch, rough though it is, we oatch a glimpse of power and
splendor which recalls that she was onoe queen of the Mediterranean and head of a vast commeroial empire.
Perhaps our most familiar impression of the struoture of Carthage, and only one purporting to represent the oity as it appeared in the earliest period, is Virgil's imaginative conoeption in the first book of the Aeneid: l
Aeneas marvels at the massive buildings, mere huts onoe; marvels at the gates, the din, and paved high roads. Eagerly the
Tyrians press on, some to build walls, to rear the oitadel, and
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roll up stones by hand; some to choose the site for a dwelling
and enolose it with a furrow. Here some are digging harbors,
bare others lay the deep foundations of their theatre and hew
out of the cliff vast columns, lofty adornments for the stage •••
Amid the city was a grove luxuriant in shade •••• Here Sidonian Dido was founding to Juno a mighty temple, rioh in gifts and
the presenoe of the goddess. Brazen was its threshold, uprising
on steps; bronze plates were its lintel beams, on doors of
bronze oreaked the hinges •••• While beneath the mighty temple •••
he soans each object, while he marvels at the city's fortune,
the handicraft of the several artists and the work of their toil
he sees in due order the battles of Ilium, the warfare now known
by fame throughout the world.
Granted the poetic nature of Virgil's desoription, though we
may not aooept the details as historioally accurate, still the
general impression of massive structure and vast material resources is borne out by Strabo and Appian in their more prosaio
acoounts of the oity at a later time. Strabo is brief,

ske~ching

only the predominant features of the city:2
Carthage is situated on a kind of peninsula, whioh oomprises
a circuit of three hundred and sixty stadia, and this circuit
has a wall; and sixty stadia of the length of this cirouit
ocoupy the neok itself, extending from sea to sea •••• Near the
middle of the city was the acropolis, Which they called Byrsa;
it was a fairly steep height and inhabited on all sides, and at
the top it had a temple of Asolepius •••• Below the aoropolis lie
the harbors, as also Cothon, a circular isle surrounded by a
strait, which latter has ship houses all round on either side.
Appian's description of the oity is very much longer, filling
in some

detail~

of these general features mentioned by Strabo,

though the two fail to agree in matters of direction and distanoe. The combined

acoount~,

however, afford a picture of Car-

thage suffioient at least for our purpose, i.e. to indicate a
~ighll developed material culture, manifested in the ingenuity

of her harbors and fortifications, the power of her resources,
and their effioient organization for military purposes, the
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of well oonstructed temples and an agora, of multi-

storied dwellings, and monumental public works like the giant
stairway ascending the height of Byrsa. Appian's longest desoriptive passage is as follows: 3
The city lay in a recess of a great gulf and was in the form
of a peninsula. It was separated from the mainland by an isthmUS about three miles in width. From this isthmus a narrow
and longish tongue of land, about 300 feet wide, extended towards the west between a lake and the sea. (On the sea side)
where the oity faced a precipice, it was protected by a single
wall. Towards the south and the mainland, and where the city
of Byrsa stood on the isthmus, there was a triple wall. The
height of eaoh wall was forty five feet, not taking acoount of
the parapets and the towers, which were placed all round at intervals of 200 feet, each having four stories, while their depth
was thirjy feet. Each wall was divided into two stories. In the
lower space there were stables for 300 elephants, and along side
were receptacles for their food. Above were stables for 4000
horses and places for their fodder and grain. There were barracks also for soldiers, 20,000 foot and 4000 horse. Such preparation for War Was arranged and provided for in their walls
alone. The angle whioh ran around from this wall to the harbor
along the tmngue of land mentioned above was the only weak and
low spot in the fortifications, having been negleoted from the
beginning.
The harbors had oommunication with each other, and a common
entrance from the sea seventy feet wide, which could be closed
with iron chains. The first port was for merchant vessels, and
here were collected all kinds of ships tackle. Within the seoond port was an island, and great quays were set at intervals
round both the harbor and the island. These embankments were
full of shipyards which had capacity for 220 vessels. In additionto them were magazines for their tackle and furniture. Two
Ionic columns stood in front of each dock, giving the appearance of a continuous portico to both the harbor and the island.
On the island was built the admiral's house, from whioh the
trumpeter gave signals, the herald delivered orders, and the
admiral himself overlooked everything. The island lay near the
entrance to the harbor and rose to a considerable height, so
that the admiral oould observe what waB going on at sea, while
those who were approaching by water could not get any clear
View of what took plaoe within. Not even inooming merohants'
oould see the docks at once, for a double wall enclosed them,
and there were gat es by which merchant ships could pass from
the first port to the city without traversing the dockyards.
Such was the appearance of Carthage at that time.
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Later in his account, Appian mentions the first harbor, open
to merchant vessels, as "thag part of Cothon which is in the
form of a quadrangle," and the seoond, containing the military
dookyards, as "the other part of Cothon which was in the form
of a circle.,,4 This regularity of shape leaves little doubt
that these harbors were dredged out by the Carthaginians themselves,- a public work worthy of their Phoenician ancestorsand lends historical support to at least one of Virgil's details, viz. "here some are digging harbors."

5

The harbor district lay in the north west portion of the
city. From Appian's aocount of Scipio's attack upon this district we learn that the forum was located near by:6 "The wall
around Cothon being taken, Scipio seized the neighboring forum
and ••• passed the night there under arms."
Either facing the forum, or close by, was the temple of
Apollo, which must have been of extraordinary splendor if it
corresponded to the statue housed within:? "At daylight he
brought in 4000 fresh troops. They entered the temple of Apollo,
whose statue was there, covered with gold, in a shrine of beate
gold, weighing 1000 talents."
Not far from the forum and the temple of Apollo, and like
them on the north, the sea side, of Carthage, arose the acropolis already mentioned by Strabo, the focal point of the oity,
the stronghold known as Byrsa, surmounted by the temple of Asclepius. The distriot surrounding the height was thickly populated, for:

a "There were three streets asoending from the forum
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to this fortress, along which, on either side, were houses
built closely together and six stories high."
The temple itself was "much the richest and most renowned
of all in the -citadel," and "in time of peace was reached by
an ascent of sixty steps."9 The first statement implies that
there were other temples in the citadel, less renowned than
that of Asclepius. It is not certain to whom they were dedicated; perhaps to the goddess Tanit, whose worship superceded
that of Asclepius on the geight of Byrsa when Carthage was re10
stored under the Romans.
It is likely that the senate chamber so often mentioned in
connection with the government was located here as well. There
were public baths too, which must have been situated near Byrsa
in the heart of the city,- one for the privileged classes and
another for the commons, as Valerius Maximus tells us in cas11
tigating the Carthaginian and Campanian senators for snobbery:

IIInsolentiae vero inter Carthaginiensem et Campanum senatum
quasi aemulatio fuit; ille enim separato a plebe balneo lavabatur; hic diverso foro utebatur."
In these scattered accounts, them, the bulk of Carthage
looms up before the mind's eye, its main features just distingUishable, as though seen through a mist,- the massive battlements rising on three sides from the sea and tripling to face
invaders from the mainland; the efficient land-locked harbors,
cut with geometrical precision; the forum and the temple of
Apollo, whence three roads lead through close packed dwellings
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to ascend the mount of Byrsaj and finally the height itself,
consecrated to government and the cult of Carthage's gods, and
crowned with the collonades of temples.
There is little direct mention of esthetic detail in the
ancient descriptions of Carthage. However, the public buildings
of the wealthiest city of her tiJe.s must have been splendidly
adorned with the richest materials, materials which the surrounding country produced in such abundance that they became
traditionally connected with its name. There was the famed Numidian marble, mentioned by Horace 12 as "columnas ultima recisas
Africa," and by Juvenal

13

as trlongis Numidarum fulta columnis",-

the symbol of extravagent and elegant construction. We have
seen how gold was lavished upon the shrine of Apollo in the
temple near the forum; how much

~ore

common would silver have

been in a city that had for centuries exploited the rich mines
of Spain? Pliny remarks that the precious citron wood was found
on Mt. Atlas, west of Carthage,14and that ivory, so prized at
Rome, was abundant enough in Africa to be used by the natives
for door frames and even fence posts. 1S All these precious materials must have added splendor to Carthaginian construction.
Vague and speculative as these conclusions may be, there is
one detail of which we are certain in regard to the ornamentation of Carthage. We know that the city was adorned with the
finewt artistic productions of the Greek colonies in Sicily,Silenus, Himera, Agrigentum, Gela. The only period we can der

finitely determine as marking a step forward in the artistic

l----------------------------------~
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development of Carthage is the last ten years of the fifth century, during which first Hannibal, then Hamilcar, sacked these
Greek cities and sent their art treasures across the sea to
adorn the city. After Hannibal had taken Silenus and Himera in
the expedition of 410 B.C. he returned home in triumph, burdened with spoils, as Diodorus Siculus relates: 16n When he sailed
back to Carthage, laden with a vast quantity of booty, the entire population turned out to receive him with honor."
But the second expedition fo that period, landing in Sicily
about 406 B.C., acquired for Carthage her greatest treasures.
Diodorus estimates the richness of the spoils taken from Agrigentum as follows: 17
Hamilcar, by systematically stripping both shrines and private dwellings, amassed spoils of such value as the city could
be expected to possess, numbering as it did 20,000 inhabitants,
having never yet been plundered from the time of its foundation
being the richest of almost all the Greek cities of that period
and one whose citizens spared no expense in indulging their
fondness for the beautiful in every type of art and construction. Paintings exeouted with oonsummate skill were found in
great numbers, and innumerable examples of every type of sculpture, products of the finest workmanship. He sent the most precious of these to Carthage, among them the famous "Bull of Phalaris."
18
And again he writes:
The Carthaginians, after taking the city, shipped votive
offerings from the temples, statues, eVBrything of great value,
back to Carthage.
Finally, after the fall of Gela, Hamilcar followed the same
procedure:

19

"From the temples, that is, from as many as he did

not think fit to destroy by fire, he stripped the carvings and
Whatever was of superior workmanship."

-
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During this period, then, the finest productions of the Sicilian Greek artists were brought to Carthage and set up to
adorn the city,- statues, paintings, carvings, decorative work
of all kinds. The golden statue of Apollo mentioned above was
probably acquired at this time; we know definitely that another
of giant proportions add cast in bronze, was seized when Gela
fell and sent to Tyre:

20

"The people of Gela had a statue of

Apollo outside the city, made of bronze and exceptionally large
seizing this the Carthaginians sent it to Tyre."
The Carthaginians seem to have kept many of these treasures
intact through all the vioissitudes of their history, since
Plutarch testifies that SCipio, entering Carthage after the
final struggle, "found the city full of Greek statues and votive offerings, which had oome from SiOi1y.,,21 Thereupon, as
Appian reoounts, 22 SOipio "sent word to Sioily that whatever
temple gifts they could identify as taken from them by the Carthaginians in former wars they oould come and take away."
Thus, through the last oenturies of their history at least,
the Carthaginians could boast of artistio exoellence in the
adornment of their city, though as far as we can determine from
the sources, it seems to have been borrowed, due to Greek,
rather than Punio, genius.
III. Resources of

~

City

The resouroes of Carthage corresponded to the grandeur of
her external struoture. Appian's desoription already oonveys
some oonce tion of the militar
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not a sword, nor a sufficient number of fighting men at home,
ba~ing

lost 50,000 a short time ago." Yet under the stress of

seig e , and with the courage of despair, the Carthaginians manufactured arms and ships at the rate indicated by Strabo, and
bald out against overwhelming odds for three years.
Where did they procure the materials? Some of it, as Strabo
says above, had been stored away in readiness for just such an
occasion. Zonaras suggests other sources:

26

"They melted down

the statues for the sake of the bronze in them and took the
woodwork of buildings, private and public alike; for the triremes and the engines." During the final seige Carthage was
practically cut off from all outside supply, so that it was
mainly upon the resources of just the city itself that she had
to rely; it is evident, then, why her protracted resistance was
a source of wonder and admiration to the ancients.
These details from the sources, finally, though sketchy and
none too well connected, still afford a glimpse of the general
lay-out, the magnitude and richness of construotion, the powerful material resources of Carthage,- enough at least to indicate that this aspect of her culture was highly developed.
IV. The Environs
The countryside about Carthage must have been exceedingly
fertile, well stocked, and well cultivated, from the glimpses
we catch in a few of the anoient authorities. In fact, were it
not, Carthage could neither have supported her population and
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armies, nor supplied grain to other parts of the ancient

.orld through trade. Even a large portion o£ the territory enclosed within the walls o£ Carthage was under cultivation. This
waS the suburb known as Megara, which stretched out £rom the
Syrsa on the side opposite the harbors to the wall that cut
aO ross the neck o£ the peninsula. Appian mentions it a s the
district o£ homes and gardens where Scipio gained his £irst £oot
hold within ~he walls: 2?
That part o£ Carthage called Megara ••• was a very large suburb
adjacent to the city wall •••• Megara was planted with gardens
and was £ull o£f.ruit bearing trees divided o££ by low walls and
hedges o£ brambles and thorns, besides deep ditches £ull o£
water running in every direction.
This description, such as it is, is the only one we have o£
Megara; it is enough, however, to indicate that the Carthaginlana were experts in cultivation and irrigation.
A picture o£ the countryside beyond the walls, much more detailed and impressive, has been preserved by Diodorus, who tells
how Agathocles raised the spirits o£ his men with the sight o£
its opulence, promising that they should share it when Carthage
tell: 28
The intervening countryside through which they had to travel
was cultivated as gardens and every type o£ plantation, the
Whole intersected by a well developed system o£ irrigation
through which it was plentifully watered. Landed estates bordered one another in succession, adornedw ith mansions of splendid
architecture,- an indication of the wealth of the owners. The
estates were £itted out with every possible £acility for enjoyment, collected by the inhabitants as the fruit of a long peace.
The plains were partly covered with the vine, partly with the
olive, and planted with all the other trees that bear fruit. In
another part herds of cattle and flocks of sheep were graZing,
and in the meighboring fens great numbers of war horses. In brie
all possible prosperity was manifest on those plains where the
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_ost eminent citizens of Carthage owned property and used their
.ealth for the pleasure of indulging their elegant taste. Consequently the Sicilians were much impressed with the beauty and
prosperity of the countryside.
It is not probable, of course, that the Carthaginian countryside presented so prosperous ani appearance throughout the entire
history of the city. Agathocles, as the text indicates, entered
it after the period of prolonged peace from 337 to 310 B.C., dur
ing which the fortune of the merchant city would have risen to
uncommon heights. Still, this condition of wealth and fruitfulness must have prevailed at the time of the First Punic war at
least, since that too came at the end of a long term of peace.
After the Mercenary war, however, which followed the first conflict with Rome, and after the depredations of Massinissa follow
ing the second, it is not likely that the same happy condition
continued. The merchant princes of

Cartl~ge

would have been wil-

ling to expose neither their lives nor their wealth on country
estates situated at some distance from the city walls. Moreover,
the loss of power and prestige, with the corresponding loss of
personal income, suffered by the wealthy class through the rise
of the democratic elements during the last period of Carthagin"
ian history would have discouraged the continued maintalnance
of

expensive establishments such as Diodorus describes. However,
though the land may have changed ownership in later times, it
need not be supposed that it thereby became less fruitful or
less valuable to Carthage as har source of supply.
We have seen how the wealthy built themselves magnificent
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_anaiona on their great landed estates; but what of the dwellings of the common folk, the rural workers and small farmers?
For though the estates of the nobles were undoubtedly worked by
sla~e

labor, there were apparently many independent rural com-

munities, froups of free farmers, in the vicinity of Carthage.
Diodorus mentions that Agathocles, in subduing the territory
about Carthage, I'brought more than 200 towns in all under his
dominion.

,,29

These towns were probably not much more than clus-

ters of the rude structures known as "mapalia" or "megalia"
which Virgil speaks of as originally occupying the site of Car30
thage:
"Miratur molem Aeneas, megalia quondam." Sallust describes them thus: 3l "It is an interesting fact that even to the
present day the dwellings of the rustic Numidians, which they
call rmapalia r , are oblong and have roofs with curved sides,
like the hulls of ships."
A group of these poor dwellings formed into a small village
would offer the advantages of comparionship and mutual protection to the families of rural workers who went out from them
each day to the neighboring fields, and whose lot would thus be
in sharp contrast to that of the gentlemen-farmers of Carthage
with their luxurious estates,- a circumstance Which helps to
explain why foreign invaders found them willing allies against
the Carthaginians.
In these few brief passages from the sources, then, we catch
Sight of the richness of the cultivated land in and about Carthage,- well stocked with fruit trees of all descriptions, the
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and the olive; fenced, hedged, and intersected by irriga-

tion canals; the fields beyond the walls alive with grazing
flocks and herds; the sumptuous mansions of the wealthy adorning
lUXurious estates and giving way to scattered hamlets of rustic
huts as the distance from the city increased. It is enough to
indicate that the cUltivation of rural resources corresponded to
the highly developed material culture within the city.

v. !!!!

People

Who were the people that composed this center of civilization
and inhabited the country around it? Diodorus divides them rough
32
11 into four classes:
Africa at that time was divided among four peoples: the Phoenicians, who dwelt in Carthage; the Liby-Phoenicians who occupied many coastal towns and intermarried with the Carthaginians,
being so named because of this relationship to them; the greater
part of the common people, the original inhabitants, known as
Libyans, who burned with a heaaty hatred for the Carthaginians
because of the harshness of their rule; and finally the Numidians, who occupied a large portion of Libya, extending to the
edges of the desert.
From the fact that so sharp a distinction was possible betwee
the racial groups dwelling in and about Carthage we may infer
that the Carthaginians, unlike the Romans, for example, maintain
ad a policy of exclusiveness in regard to the native subject pop
ulation, treating them as inferiors to be exploited, rather than
insuring their loyalty by incorporating them into the state or
entering into compact with them as respectable allies. The hostile attitude of the Libyans supports this conclusion; we shall
lee more of it later in regard to the attitude of the Carthagin.
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ian subjeot nations to the mother oity.
We might ask then: What did the Carthaginians look

l~.ke?

Thei

appearanoe is important for two reasons. First. and obviously.
national charaoterist1os are indioated by dress, and seoond. the
representation of the average Carthaginian in the imagination of
other peoples, like the Greeks and Romans, is significant in hel
ping to explain their attitude toward Carthage. Imagination shap
IS

attitudes and gives impulse to action. Though desoriptions'

gathered from Latin and Greek sources may not be entirely acourate in regard to the first reason, they are nevertheless important in regard to the seoond.
To the stern Roman the dres. of the Carthaginians must have
suggested ostentation and

luxurio~sness,

since they seem to have

made ample use of the rich materials supplied through world trad
to adorn their persons in lavish Eastern fashion. First. the rio
purple dye of the murex, so prized by the ancient world, was developed by the Tyrians and beoame oonneoted with their name. so
that Horaoe oould speak ot nmurioibus Tyriis iteratae veller&
lanae. n33 Tyre would have been an easy souroe of the preoious
stuff for Carthage, but she had another even oloser at hand in
the island ot Meninx and a portion of the African Coast, as Plin
points out: 34 "In Asia the best purple is that of Tyre, in Atrio
that of Meninx and the parts of Gaetulia that border on the
ooean." And Horace mentions "te bis Afro murice tinotae. n35 With
suoh ready sources of supply, then. the purple must have been a
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common article of Carthaginian trade, and even more common in
their own vesture. Thus Polybius presents Haadrubal,- the tyrant
of Carthage in her last days - as coming forth to parry with
Golosses, king of the Numidiana, "in a oomplete suit of armour,
over whioh was fastened a cloak of sea purple."36 And again, on
a second meeting, he refers to the display oontemptuously:37
'The Carthaginian again advanoed slowly to meet him in great
state, wearing his full armour and purple robe, leaving the tyrants of tragedy muoh to seek."
Appian describes a clown who appeared inthe triumphal prooession of the elder Soipio, evidently dressed to represent a
Carthaginian, "wearing a purple oloak reaohing to the feet and
golden bracelets and neoklaoe."38
Jewelry of this type was another item which must have formed
a part of the Carthaginian oostume, at least that of the wealthier classes. Gold, silver, and ivory, as we have seen, were common enough. Moreover, the Carthaginians would have been well sup
plied with glass beads and trinkets by their Phoenician kinsmen,

who, acoording to Pliny,39 had disoovered the process for making
glass, for which, as Strabo mentions, Tyre furnished the sand
and Sidon the workmanshiP:40 "Between Ace and Tyre is a sandy
beach which produces the sand used in making glass. Now the sand
it is said, is not fused here, but is oarried to Sidon and there

melted and cast."
Not only glass beads, however, but genuine precious stones,
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.ust have been plentiful in this center of world trader one type
of ruby, or carbuncle, for example, was called "Carthaginian"
41
because of its abundance there, as Pliny says:
"Horum (carbun..
oulorumJ genera, Indici et Garamantici, quos et Charcedonios vooant, propter opulentiam Cart?aginis Magnae."
That the men of Carthage were accustomed to deck themselves
with jewelry may be gathered from the fact that at one time the
government encouraged military service by offering the oitizens
a decoration of this sort as a publio distinotion, as Aristotle
points out:

42

"Indeed, among some peoples there are even certain

laws stimulating military valour; for instance at Carthage, we
are told, warriors receive the deooration of armuleta of the
same number as the oampaigns on which they have served."
The ordinary form of dress worn in time of peace was a loose
tunic, without a belt or girdle, probably highly colored. Gellius remarks: 43 "Quintus Ennius also seems to have spoken not
nthout soorn of the 'tunic-clad men' of the Carthaginians." And
Plautus, in the Poenulus, oapitalizes on this Roman scorn with
references to the dress of Hanno, a rioh old Carthaginian: 44
But what bird is that arriving here in the tunios? Was
his cloak nabbed at the baths, I wonder?
(975-6)
Hey, you without a belt, •••
WhOIS

(1008)

the ohap with the long tunics like a tavern boy?
(1298)

-Though the details are scattered and meagre, still they are
suffioient to conjure up the image of a bearded Semet10 in a
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long, loose robe of richly dyed material, glittering with gems,
glass beads or trinkets, with the deeper glint of gold or silver
at his throat and wrists and on his ivory sword hilt, scented,
perhaps, with the perrumes of the East, his whole dress suggesting to the Roman ostentatious wealth and luxury, - such is the
impression of the wealthy Carthaginian merchant or noble.
What of the dress of the lower classes? The historians, of
course, are not much concerned with it, and leave us without a
clue. It was probably as much like that of the merchants and
nobles as their means would allow. One characteristic may be
noted. The fondness for jewelry seems to have been universal.
Plautus introduoes Carthaginian slaves with rings in their earj~
"Well, here they are with ring-arrayed ears." And it may be remembered that the Mercenary War was partially financed by the
peasant women of nearby Libyan villages who "stripping themselves of their jewels contributed them ungrudgingly to the war
tund. n46 In general, it is probable that the dress of the North
African peasant has not changed radically in the course of the
centuries, so that he must have appeared in the days of Carthaginian glory much as he does today.
VI. The Armies of Carthage
Carthage, true to her commercial character, preferred to pay
others to do most of her fighting, though she provided the generals and at least a nucleus of native Carthaginian soldiery. Up
to the time of the Third Punic War she depended almost entirely
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upon foreign troops for conquest and protection, recruiting them
not only

a~ong

the African coast, but from every oountry ahd is-

land on the European side of the Meditarranean.
As early as 480 B.C. the Carthaginians sent a host against
Gal on of Syraouse oonsisting, acoording to Herodotus, of "Phoenioians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Elisyci, Sardinians, and
cyrnians, led by Hamilcar, son of Hanno, the king of the Carthaginians."47 The Ligyes were Ligurians, the Cyrnians Corsicans,
and the Elisyci an Iberian people.
In the next Sicilian expedition of 410, sent to relieve Egesta, aooording to Diodorus,48 "the Carthaginians dispatched to
the Egestians 5000 Libyans and 800 Campanians," while Hannibal,
their general, "throughout that summer and the following winter
oolleoted large mercenary forces from Spain, and enlisted a con

M

siderable number of citizens; then travelling through Libya, selected the best men from each village." The army thus oollected
numbered at the lowest estimate 10QOOO, as Diodorus recounts: 49
"The whole of Hannibal's army, as Ephorus reoords, numbered
200,000 foot and 40,000 horse; but Timaeus claims there were no
more than 100,000. 0
When the Carthaginians decided on a seoond expedition four
years later an even more extensive enlistment was made; thus
Dlodorus says:50
They lthe generals] sent out certain eminent Carthaginians
with vast sums of money to Spain and to the Balearic Islands,
with orders to enlist as many meroenaries as possible, while
they themselves went through Libya, enrolling Libyan and Phoe-
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ici an troops, including the best of their fellow citizens. They
°ummoned Moors and Numidians from the kings and tribes allied to
~~em, and even some from the territory around Cyrene. Then they
hired Campanians, whom they transported from Italy to Africa.
It was this army that took Agrigentum and brought the treasures of Sicily to Carthage.
Later in their history, however, the Carthaginians did more
of the fighting themselves. Thus in 383 B.C. they raised a body
of troops from their own number. Carthaginians enrolled in former campaigns were for the most part officers; now they were
called upon to serve in the ranks. "Prudently foreseeing a prolonged struggle, they enlisted as soldiers those citizens who
were suitable."51 Yet these citizen troops were only a part of
the army, since they hired great numbers in addition: 52 "And
gathering a great sum of money, they hired large forces of mercenaries."
In the war with Timoleon some forty years later, an estimated
10,000 native Carthaginians appeared in an army of 70,000, as

Plutarch records: 53
••• the enemy were seen crossing, in the van their four-horse
chariots formidably arrayed for battle, and behind these ten
thousand men-at-arms with white shields. These the Corinthians
conjectured to be Carthaginians from the splendor of their armor
and the slowness and good order of their march.
Thus the citizen troops impressed the Greeks as being well
armed and disciplined; they represented, moreover, the aristocracy of Carthage. Yet the action that followed ended in the
sorest defeat the city had ever suffered: 54
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It is said that among 10,000 dead bodies, 3000 were those of
carthaginians,- a great affliction for the city. For no others
were superior to these in birth or wealth or reputation, nor is
it recorded that so many native Carthaginians ever perished in
a single battle before, but they used Libyans for the most part
and Iberians and Numidians for their battles, and thus sustained defeats at the cost of other nations.
About twenty years later, when Agathocles suddenly appeared
before the walls of Carthage, the citizens were forced to turn
out in numbers, since there was no time for a levy of mercenaries from Spain or the islands, or even the African coast. Diodorus speaks of the event: 55
The Carthaginian generals, seeing that there was no time for
delay, refused to wait for troops from the surrounding country
and from allied cities, but called out the citizens themselves,
not less than 40,000, including a thousand horse and two thousand chariots. Hanno was in charge of the right wing, supported
by the Sacred Cohort.
This Sacred Cohort probably represented the wealth and nobility of Carthage, and acquitted itself honorably, fighting on
despite the loss of its leader and the flight of the Libyans.
These latter, as has been mentioned, formed the bulk of the common people and probably of the army in this instance. Justinus
puts the total strength of this army at 30,000, a more likely
figure than the one above: 56 "Obvius eis fuit cum XXX milibus
Poenorum Hanno." This was as close to a purely citizen army as
Carthage had ever mobilized. It was defeated, however, by Agathocles, and with severe losses.
By the time of the First Punic war the Carthaginians had apparently reverted to their practice of depending almost entire-

ly upon mercenaries. Diodorus presents an impOSing list of those
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whO took part in thi s w ar and in t he mercenary rebellion that
followed:57 "Those who had been enlisted to fight with the Carthaginians were Spaniards, Gauls, Balearians, Libyans, Phoenicians, Ligurians, and Greek slaves of various cities; and these
rebelled." Polybius adds 58 that "the largest portion consisted
of Libyans" and that the entire force was "more than 20,000 in
number."
There has been much discussion among scholars about Hannibal's army in the Second Punic war; it will be sufficient here,
59

however, to cite the statement of Polybius on the army of Italy:
••• his regiments were not only of different nationalities
but of different races. For he had with him Africans, Spaniards,
Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, and Greeks, peoples
who neither in their laws, customs, or language, nor in any
other respect had anything naturally in common.
As to the army in Africa, the Carthaginian array before the
battle of Zama is typical: 60
Hannibal placed in front of his whole force his elephants,
of which he had over eighty, and behind them the mercenaries
numbering about twelve thousand. They were composed of Ligurians, Celts, Balearic Islanders, and Moors. Behind these he
placed the native Libyans and C rthaginians, and last of all
the troops he had brought over ~rom Italy • ••• He secured his
wings by cavalry, placing the Numidian allies on the left and
the Carthaginian horse on the right.

Finally, in a passage which compares the relative strength of
Rome and Carthage with particular reference to the Second Punic
w~, Polybius writes: 61

. As regards military service on land the Romans are much more
efficient. They indeed devote their whole energies to this matter, whereas the Carthaginians entirely neglect their infantry,
though they do pay some sllght attention to their cavalry. The
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reason of this is that the troops they employ are foreign and
mercenary, whereas those of the Romans are natives of the soil
and citizens.
After the Second Punic war Carthage's mercenary armies disappear. Conquest was forbidden herj any attempt to enlist troops
would have brought sanctions from Rome. The Third Punic war was
fought by the Carthaginians themselves, with help from the surrounding countryside. Their plight at the beginning of the war
has been described by Appian, who mentions among other details~2
"Nor had they mercenaries, nor friends, nor allies, nor time to
procure any." Their chief support at first must have been the
army of 30,000 which the exiled Hasdrubal had collected, probably from his followers in the city and natives of the surrounding territory. The ranks of the army within the walls were
swelled by freeing the slaves: 63 "The same day the Carthaginian
senate declared war and proclaimed freedom to the slaves. They
also chose generals and selected Hasdrubal for the outside work,
whom they had condemned to death, and who had already collected
30,000 men." This army included a considerable force of cavalry,
for we know that when the chief cavalry officer, Phameas, deserted to Scipio, he brought a large number with him: 64 "Some of
the officers went over to the enemy with their forces, to the
number of about 2,200 horse. n Even during the final phase of the
war, after the capture of Megara, Hasdrubal still had an army of
30,000 within the city, for Appian tells us that "the supplies
brought by the ships Hasdrubal distributed to his 30,000 sol-
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diers whom he had chosen to fight, neglecting the multitude."65
There was, moreover, in the country beyond, a large supporting
force of Africans under Diogenes, whose duty was to keep the
supply lines open and the natives loyal. SCipio routed this
force at Nepheris and, as Appian says,66 "Galussa pursued them
with his Numidian cavalry and elephants and made a great slaugh
ter, as many as 70,000, including non-combatants, being killed,
10,000 captured, and about 4000 escaped." All this gives some
comcept of the armed force Carthage could raise from just her
own citizens and the natives of the surrounding countryside.
In conclusion, then, it is evident that Carthage depended
almost entirely upon mercenary armies throughout the greater
part of her known history, though during the fourth century the
Carthaginians themselves took anactive part in bearing arms.
The Third Punic war, however, was fought without the aid of mercenaries, proving that

C~rthage

could raise a formidable army

of her own, and manifesting her amazing native powers when driven to desperation. The contrast, then, between the

C~rthagin

ian and the Roman attitude at this time becomes clear. The Carthaginians depended mainly upon mercenary troops, supplementing
them with citizen forces when necessary; the Romans depended on
their main body of citizen-soldiers, supplementing it with foreign allies. The Romans preferred to do their own fighting; the
Carthaginians paid others to do it for them.
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VII. The Navies
The ancients are of one accord in regard to the naval stren••
gth of c~rthage.
They agree that in her prime she was complete
mistress of the Western Mediterranean. Dionysius of HalicarnaSUS

echoes them all when he speaks of "the Carthaginians, whose

maritime strength was superior to that of all others."6? Polybius adds some reasons for this supremacy while comparing Rome
and carthage: 68 "The Carthaginians naturally are superior at
sea both in efficiency and equipment, because seamanship has
long been their national craft, and they busy themselves with
the sea more than any other people." The first may be attributed
to their Phoenician background, the second to their character
as a merchant city.
The Carthaginians were, moreover, proverbially jealous of
their control of the sea and took drastic measures to preserve
it, as Strabo remarks: 69 "According to Eratosthenes, the expulsion of foreigners is a custom common to all barbarians ••• and
the Carthaginians likewise, he adds, used to drown in the sea
any foreigners who sailed past their country to Sardo (sardinia)

or to the Pillars." There seems to have been an ancient boast,
too, that no man could wash his hands in the sea without the
consent of Carthage.
A few instances lnay be cited to indicate the magnitude of the
naval forces by which Carthage maintained her hegemony. In the
early period of her history, when Hannibal had gathered his
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forces for the expedition of 410 B.C. against Sicily, Diodorus
88.ys:70 "He manned 60 ships of war and fitted out about 1500
transports, in which he conveyed his troops, siege machinery,
.eapons, and all other equipment." Fleets of the same proportions passed back and forth from Carthage to Sicily several
times during the period of wars with Dionysius which followed,
from 406 to 368 B.C., and the tyrant was finally defeated
through the efficiency of the Carthaginian navy. Having reopened
hostilities in 368 by taking Selinus, Entellus, and Eryx, Dionys1us was besieging Lilybaeum when he heard that the docks at
carthage had burnt. Thinking, therefore, that he would not need
his fleet, he sent much of it back to Syracuse, keeping 130
ships at Eryx. "But,1t says Diodorus,7l lithe Carthaginians, contrary to all expectation, manned 200 ships and bore down upon
the enemy lying at anchor in the harbor of Eryx. 1t Dionysius lost
over half his squadron, called a truce, and, dying shortly afterwards, left victory to the Carthaginians. About thirty years
later Carthage sent another armada to Sicily against Timoleon,
as Plutarch records: 72 "Meanwhile the Carthaginians put in at
Lilybaeum with an army of 70,000 men, 200 triremes, and 1000
transports carrying engines of war, four-horse chariots, grain
in abundance, and other requisite equipment.
Through naval armaments of this magnitude Carthage maintaine
uninterrupted sway over the Mediterranean, so that at the beginning of the First

~Anic

war Polybius could refer to them as lithe
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carthaginians, who had held for generations undisputed command
of the sea. tl73 It was in this war that her maritime supremacy
was questioned for the first time, and that by the Romans who
had never taken seriously to the sea before. still, in the firs
engagement at Mylae (260 B.C.) a fleet of 130 Carthaginian ship
was defeated and put to flight by not more than 100 clumsy Roma
vessels, through the success of a device which the Romans used
to pin the Carthaginian ships close to theirs, enabling their
marines to carry the action. Made more

w~y

by this defeat, the

Carthaginians employed the next four years in strengthening
their fleet for a decisive engagement. The Romans made good use
of the time and did the same. In 256 B.C. the two fleets met at
Eonomos in one of the greatest naval battles of all times. Poly
bius carefully reoords the forces involved: 74
The Romans ••• set to sea with a fleet of 330 deoked ships
of war ••• the Carthaginians setting sail with 350 deoked vessels ••• The Roman foroes embarked on the ships numbered abou
140,000, each ship holding 300 rowers and 120 soldiers. The
Carthaginians were chiefly or solely adapting their preparation
to a maritime war, their numbers being, to reokon by the number
of ships, aotually above 150,000.
After describing the engagement, Polybius concludes: 75
The final result of the whole battle was in favor of the
Romans. The latter lost twenty four sail sunk, and the Carthaginians more than thirty. Not a single Roman ship with its crew
fell into the enemy's hands, but sixty four Carthaginian ships
were so captured.
The Victory was again determined by the Roman device mentioned above, rather than by superior seamanship; nevertheless, Carthage at her best had been defeated. She was kept on the defen-

sive until the third Roman fleet was destroyed by storm, when
she was left once more supreme. But instead of strengthening
their position, the Carthaginians "economized" by neglecting
their fleet. Consequently the launching of a fourth fleet by
the Romans caught them unprepared. Though the Carthaginians at
once sent out their fleet to meet the new challange, they were
miserably defeated, for, as Polybius records,?6 "their ships,
being loaded, were not in a serviceable condition for battle,
while the crews were quite untrained, and had been put on board
for the .emergency, and their marines were recent levies whose
first experience of the least hardship and danger this was."
Consequently they "were soon routed, fifty ships being sunk and
seventy captured with their crews." The result was that Rome
thenceforward commanded the sea, and Carthage had to ask for
terms. Her long maritime supremacy was broken. Her greatest
strength had lain in this domination of the Mediterranean; she
had lost it through a fatal attempt to economize.
That the Carthaginian supremacy on the sea was not subsequen-

tly restored may be inferred from two considerations. First,
Hannibal chose to march his army across the Alps into Italy, instead of transporting them by sea from Spain. Second, Scipio had
a small and newly constructed fleet, consisting originally, as
Livy says,?? of "thirty ships, twenty quinqueremes and ten quadriremes which, upon the insistence of Scipio himself, were so
rapidly constructed that precisely forty five days after their
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timbers had been cut in the forest they were launched l

~llly

ar

mad and fully equipped." This was increased after his sojourn
in SicilYI so that putting out from Lilybaeum l "he sent his arm
across in transports numbering al!nost four hundred l escorted by
forty ships of war."78 Yet this fleetl still comparatively
smal11 made the crossing unmolested by the Carthaginians. "I
take it on the authority of many Greek and Latin writers that
the crossing was made successfully without threat or disturbance l

"

says Livy.79

After the fall of Tunis the Romans were almost taken unaware
by a fleet from Carthage l and might have been annihilated had

the Carthaginians not lost their spiritl as Livy remarks: 80
If the Carthaginians had hastened to the attaok they might
have overwhelmed all in oonfusion and fear at the first onslaught; but so oppressed were they by their defeats on land
that they lost heart even at seal where they had been most
powerful I and so after passing the day in aimless maneuvers at
sundown they put in with their fleet at the port which the Africans call Ruscinona.
The following daYI after an attaok on the Romans l they suoceeded only in capturing six transports. "Sex ferme onerariae
puppibus abstraotae Carthaginem sunt. lt8l
Thus l during the Second Punic war the Carthaginian fleet was
certainly not the force to reckon with that it was in the First.
Carthage oould evidently no longer boast of being mistress of
the Mediterranean l at least. And the treaty which ended the war
ended all future pretensions to naval power for the Carthaginians with the demand that "they surrender their ships of war l
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.i tb the exception of ten triremes."82

VIII. The Empire - Sources of Wealth
In the course of her history Carthage had grown from a simple
Phoenician colony to the powerful capital of a vast empire, as
APpian points out: 83
Later on, using this tthe original site) as a base and getting the upper hand of their neighbors in war, and engaging in
traffic by sea, like all Phoenicians, they built the outer city
round Byrsa. Gradually acquiring strength they mastered Africa
and a great part of the Mediterranean, carried war abroad into
Sicily and Sardinia and the other islands of the sea, and also
into Spain, while they sent out numerous colonies. They became
a match for the Greeks in power, and next to the Persians in
wealth.
This empire must have been established by the end of the
fifth century, for Dionysius, contemplating hostillties against
Carthage about 397 B.C., prepared huge armaments, as Diodorus
relates,84 "because he realized that he was about to struggle
with the most powerful people of Europe."
Fear of this ever-growing empire of Carthage and not mere
lust for power was behind Rome's support of the Mamertines,- the
85

episode which began the First Punic war - according to Polybius:
They saw that the Carthaginians had not only reduced Libya
to subjection, but a great part of Spain besides, and that they
were also in possession of all the islands in the Sardinian and
Tyrrhenian Seas. They were therefore in great apprehension lest,
if they also became ma.sters of Sicily, they would be most
troublesome and dangerous neighbors, hemming them in on all
sides and threatening every part of Italy.
Vfuat were the motives behind this constant expansion? Three
suggest themselves at once. (1) Carthage probably decided definitely on an imperial policy when the Greeks began to establish
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oolonies in the western Mediterranean, threatening her trade
supremaoy in that part of Europe. (2) She found oolonizing a
painless and profitable means of thinning out her population,
as Aristotle remarks: 86 "They oonstantly send out a partion of
the common people to appointments in the cities [0010nies1 ; by
this means they heal the sooial sore and make the constitution
stable." And again: 87 "By following some suoh policy as this
the Carthaginians have won the friendship of the common people;
for they oonstantly send out some of the people to the surrounding territories and so make them well off." {3} It is evident,
however, that the rulers of Carthage were anxious to counteract
Greek expansion, and her people were willing to be transported
to foreign soil, for a motive whioh was characteristio of the
natlon,- the hope of gain. Carthage was established as a Phoenician trading station; she grew into a nation of rioh merchants; her empire was maintained as a source of wealth.
We have already mentioned some of the wealth supplied to Carthage by her African subjeots,- grain, fruit, live stock, ivory,
citron wood, precious stones, dyes. These riohes, and more, Carthage could gather, first, through trade with her subjects.
These she restrained from commerce with other nations that she
might exploit them herself. At first, it is true, her polioy
Was more liberal, as is shown by a treaty conoluded with Rome,
at the end of the sixth century, which agrees, as Polybius interprets it,88 that "to Carthage herself and all parts of Libya

91

on this side of the Fair Promontory, to Sardinia and the Carthaginian province of Sicily, the Romans may come for trading purposes, and the Carthaginian state engages to secure payment of
their just debts." But from a later treaty with Rome, supposed
to have been made about 306 B.C., it is evident how narrow her
policy became. Polybius records the treaty:89
The Romans shall not maraud or trade or found a city on the
farther side of the Fair Promontory, Mostia, and Tarseum • •••
No Roman shall trade or found a city in Sardinia and Libya nor
remain in a Sardinian or Libyan port longer than is required
for taking in provisions or repairing his ship. If he be driven
there by stress of weather, he shall depart within five days.
In the Carthaginian province of Sicily and at Carthage he may
do and sell anything that is permitted to a citizen.
It is significant that this agreement was made less than a
half century before the

outbre~k

of the First Punio war.

The exclusive trade with their African subjects, however, did
not satisfy the Carthaginians. For, in addition, they sailed
along the western coast of Africa beyond the Pillars, carrying
on a "dumb

tr~dett

with the natives" probebly very primitive
people, as Herodotus tells: 90
There is a place, they say, where men dwell beyond the Pillars of Heracles; to this they come and unload their cargo; then
having laid it orderly by the waterline they go aboard their
ships and light a smoking fire. The people of the country see
the smoke, and coming to the sea, they lay down go!d to pay for
the cargo and withdraw away from the wares. Then the Carthaginians disembark and examine the gold; if it seems to them a fair
price for their cargo, they take it and go their ways; but if
not, they go aboard again and wait and the people come back and
add more gold till the shipmen are satisfied. Herein neither
party (it is said) defrauds the other; the Carthaginians do not
lay hands on the gold till it matches the value of their cargo,
nor do the people touch the cargo till the shipmen have taken
the gold.
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In sharp contrast to this primitive kind of trade with the
African aborigines in the Westl the Carthaginians entered into
corr.plex cormnercial relations with the highly civilized Egyptians
to the East. They must have supplied Egypt with the products of
western Europe l and sometimes with grain. 9l We know that they
were on very friendly terms wi th the Egyptians at the time of
the First Punic war l and that their credit was good enough to
lead them to hope for a large loan from the Egyptian treasury I
as Appian records: 92 "Both Romans and Carthaginians were destitute of money ••. the Carthaginians sent an embassy to PtolemYI
the son of PtolemYI the son of Lagusl king of Egyptl seeking to
borrow 2000 talents. lie was on terms of friendship with both
Romans and Carthaginians." The loan was refused l however l out of
deference to Rome. But the attempt at least is an indication of
the relations existing between Carthage and Egypt.
While individuals were enriched by t hi s trade I moreover I the
public treasury was filled by taxes levied upon African colonies
and

~ll.bject

peoples. There are several IncUcations that the re-

venues demanded byt he mother city were excessive. As has been
mentioned l the grinding taxation led the Libyans to support the
Mercenary Revolt l according to Polybius: 93
They had exa.cted from the peasantrYI without exception l half
of their cropsl and had doubled the taxation of the townsmen
without allowing exemption from any tax or even a partial abatement to the poor. They had applauded and honored not those governors who treated the people with gentleness and humanitYI but
those who procured for Carthage the largest amount of supplies
and stores and used the country people harshlYI- Hanno l for example. The consequence was that the male population required no
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incitement to revolt, •• "
Again, the tax paid bY one of the Afrio an cities is recorded
by Livy:94 "They call tpis district Emporia; it is the coast of
tbe Lesser Syrtis and a fertile spot; one of its cities is Leptis, and this paid to tpe Carthaginian s a tribute of one talent
per day." This is almost unbelievable when we realize that after
the Second Punic war Carthage herself was only required to pay
Rome an indemnity of 200 talents per annwn for fifty years,
which was considered a peavy penalty.
These two examples of land tax or tribute certainly indicate
that Carthage demanded ~n excessive rate; the same is probably
true also of the other Wlown form of taxation, the tariff, mentioned by Livy in regard to the reforms of Hannibal :95 "When
Hannibal had investigated the revenues, hOw much was collected
as taxes on land and as duty at the ports, ••• " Altogether, then,
the Carthaginians reaped abundant profit from their African holdings, privately througP trade, publicly through tribute and
tariff revenues.
Spain was perhaps the oldest, and at least the richest, posw
session of Carthage in BUrope. The Phoenicians had come there
first in .the earliest times, as Strabo rernarks:96 liThe PhoeniCians • • • occupied the best of Iberia and Libya before the age
of Homer, and continued to be masters of those regions until the
Romans broke up their eJIlpire." strabo here evidently includes
the Carthaginians under the term "Phoenicians". It is not clear
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just when the Carthaginians as such came into the country; they

may have taken over after Tyre was destroyed by Alexander. We
dO

knOW

definitely that Spain was invaded by a Carthaginian arm

under Hamilcar Barca after the Pirst Punic war (238 B.C.), but
this expedition served to consolidate and strengthen the power
of carthage, not to establish it there for the first time, as
APpian indicates: 97 "I think also that from an early time the
Phoenicians frequented Spain for purposes of trade, and occupied
certain places there." And further :98 "This favored land, abounding in all good things the Carthaginians began to exploit before the Romans. A part of it they already occupied and another
part they plundered, until the Romans expelled them from the
part they held ••• tt
The Phoenicians settled in what was known as Turdetania, on
the western side of the Pillars above Gades, a region of extraordinary riches, as we shall see. Speaking of the Iberians,
Strabo says:99 "Indeed the people became so utterly subject to
the Phoenicians that the greater number of the cities in Turdetania and of the neighboring places are now inhabited by the
Phoenicians." They also founded the city of Gades on the island
of that name, the modern Cadiz, as Strabo, among others, records :100
••• about the founding of Gades, the Gaditanians recall a
certain oracle, which was actually given, they say, to the Tyrians, ordering them to send a colony to the Pillars of Heracles ••• the men who arrived on the third expedition founded
Gades, and placed the temple in the eastern part of the island
but the city in the western.
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It was probably these possessions, Gades and Turdetania,
wb.ich the Carthaginians took over from Tyre, and which "they
b.ad already occupied" when Hamilcar arrived to" pl under another
parttf of Spain in 238 B.C., for it is here that Hamilcar landed
from Carthage, using this territory as a base for further conquest, as Appian says:10l "At the end of the war ••• Hamilcar
was left in sole command of the army. He associated his son-inlaw Hasdrubal with him, crossed the straits to Gades, and thence
crossing into Spain, plundered the territory of the Spaniands
without provocation. II
Why should the Carthaginians'be so interested in this portion
of Spain beyond the Straits? First of all, the district had muc
to attract the attention of the merchant princes. Strabo describes it in glowing terms as it was at his time: 102 tlTurdetania
itself is marvellously blessed by nature; and while it produces
all things, and likewise great quantities of them, these blessings are doubled by the facilities for exportation." And after
discussing the waterways which afford these facilities, he continues :103
There are exported from Turdetania large quantities of grain
and wine, and also olive oil, not only in large quantities, but
of the best quality. And further, wax, honey, and pitch are exported from there, and large quantities of kermes and ruddle
tdye stuffs] which is not inferior to the Sinopean earth. And
they build their ships there out of native timber; and they
have salt quarries ••• and not unimportant, either, is the fishsalting industry that is carried on ••• Formerly much cloth
came from Turdetania, but now wool, rather of the raven-black
sort ••• Surpassing too are the delicate fabrics which are woven by the people of Salacia. Turdetania also has a great abundance of cattle of all kinds, and of game.
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The value of trade resources like these is evident; but the
country possessed far greater riches of another kind. It was
perhaps the most prolific source of wealth in the Carthaginian
empire because, as Strabo says:l04
Although the aforesaid country had been endowed with so many
good things, still one might welcome and admire, not least of
all but even most of all, its natural richness in metals ••••
Up to the present moment, in fact, neither gold, nor silver,
nor yet copper, nor iron, has been found anywhere in the world,
1n a natural state, either in such quantities or of such good
quality.
Gold there was in abundance, which, as Strabo explains,105
"is not only mined, but washed down ••• and the so-called 'goldwasheries' are now more numerous than the gold mines •••• And
1n the gold dust, they say, nuggets weighing as much as half a
pound are sometimes found." But Spain produced, above all else,
silver, as Diodorus remarks :106 "For this land possesses, we may
venture to say, the most abundant and most excellent known sources of silver, and to the workers of this silver it returns
great revenues."' While Strabo testifies :107 "The wealth of Iberia is further evidenced by t he following facts; the Carthaginians who, along with Barcas, made a campaign against Iberia,
found the people in Turdetania, as the historians tell us, using
sil ver feeding troughs and wine jars. tt
If the Carthaginians had enjoyed the wealth of Turdetania before, even this was augmented by the expedition of 238 B.C., for
Hasdrubal established their power on the south-eastern coast of
Spain by founding the city of New Carthage, and opening up rich
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1ei ns of silver, newly discovered in the vicinity. The value of
tn ese mines may be estimated from what they yielded to the Roman
treasury at a later time, as Strabo reports: l08
Polybius, in mentioning the silver mines of New Carthage,
says that they are very large; that they are distant from the
city about twenty stadia l and embrace an area four hundred stadia in circuit; and that 40,000 work men stay there, who, (in
hiS time) bring into the Roman exchequer a daily revenue of
25,000 drachmae.
Finally, what this constant supply of silver meant to Carthage throughout her history may be

g~thered

from the remarks

109
with which Diodorus closes his description of the Spanish mines:
Not one of the mines has a recent beginning, but all of them
were opened by the covetousness of the Carthaginians at the time
when Iberia was among their possessions. It was from these mines
, .• that they drew their continued growth, hiring the ablest
mercenaries to be found and winning with their aid wars many and
great. For it is in general true that in their wars the Carthaginians never rested their confidence in soldiers from among
their own citizens or gathered from their allies, but that when
they subjected the Romans and the Sicilians and the inhabitants
of Libya to the greatest perils it was by money, thanks to the
abundance of it which they derived from their mines, that they
conquered them in every instance.
The city of New Carthage was, for the short period the Carthaginians occupied it after its foundation, their stronghold
and the center of their activities in Spain. Scipio recognized
this when he made it the first objective in his conquest of that
country. Upon inquiring, according to Polybius,110
••• he learnt ••• that it stood almost alone among Spanish cities in possessing harbors fit for a fleet and for naval forces,
and that it was at the same time very favorably situated for the
Carthaginians to make the direct sea crossing to Africa. Next he
heard that the Carthaginians kept the bulk of their money and
their war material in this city, as well as their hostages from
the whole of Spain, and ••• that the trained soldiers who garrisoned the citadel were only about a thousand in number, ••• whil
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tne remaining population was exceedingly large but composed of
artisans, tradesmen, and sailors.
The wealth of this, the last and most famous of the colonies
of carthage, is seen in the spoils taken by Scipio after the
fall of the city in 210 B.C., as Appian records: lll
In the captured city he obtained great stores of goods, useful in peace and war, many arms, darts, engines, dockyards containing thirty three war ships, corn and provisions of various
kinds, ivory, gold, and silver, some in the form of plate, some
coined and some uncoined, also Spanish hostages, and everything
that had been captured from the Romans themselves.
The capture of New Carthage broke the Carthaginian power in
Spain and lost for Carthage the richest province of her empire,
stemmed the constant stream of silverwhich had flowed thence
into her treasury, broke up the trade monopoly which she must
have imposed, according to her custom, upon her own rich possessions, and drove her out of Europe forever.
In addition to part of Africa and Spain, the Carthaginians
laid claim to most of the islands in the western Mediterranean.
We have already seen some of their operations in Sicily, and the
treaty quoted from Polybius showed that they regarded Sardinia
as their own. This latter island would have been of use to Carthage, first, for its agricultural products, for, as Strabo
says,l12 "the greater part of Sardo is rugged ••• though much
of it has also soil that is blessed with all products,- especial
ly with grain." Then, the Sardinians were useful as soldiers, of
Whom Strabo says further: ll3 "Later on the Phoenicians of Carthage got the mastery over them, and along with them carried on
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war against the Romans." They were, however, never really fully
conquered, as Diodorus points out: 114 "The Carthaginians, thoug
their power extended far and they subdued the island, were not
able to enslave its former possessors." And again: 115 "Although
the Carthaginians made war upon them many times with considerable armies, yet because of the rugged nature of the country
and the difficulties of dealing with their dug-out dwellings,
the people remained unenslaved." Carthage was forced to cede
this island to the Romans after the First Punic war by a treaty
which Polybius records: 116 "The Carthaginians are to evacuate
Sardinia and pay a further sum of twelve hundred talents." In
the words of the same author in another place: 117 "Thus was Sar
dinia lost to the Carthaginians, an island of great extent,
most thickly populated and most fertile."
Corsica probably never belonged to Carthage; at least there
is no mention of Carthaginian occupation in Strabo or Diodorus.
But about 536 B.C. Carthage did ally herself with the Tyrhennians to drive out a colony of Phocaeans who settled there and
interfered with Carthaginian trade, as Herodotus recalls: 118
"But they {the Phocaeans1 harried and plundered all their
neighbors; wherefore the Tyrhennians and Carthaginians made
common cause against them, and sailed to attack them with sixty
ships." Thus, though Carthage did not own Corsica, she policed
it, exercising indirect control in this way.
Next, to the West, was the Balearic group, which belonged to
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carthage and helped to maintain the empire by supplying the
~ous

f~

light armed troops known as Balearic slingers, who figured

prominently in the Carthaginian armies. In describing the

SO

tWO

islands, Diodorus mentions that "in the hurling of large

"

stones with slings the natives are the most skillful of all men,
and that "in early times they served in the campaigns of the

carthaginians."119 Further, of the islands themselves, hesayst 20
The smaller (Minorcal lies more to the east and maintains
great droves and flocks of every kind of animal, especially
mules, which stand very high and are exceptionally strong. Both
islands have good land which produces fruits, and a multitude
of inhabitants numbering more than 30,000.
Here again were agricultural products and man power for Carthage.
Further westward, within the Pillars, were the Pityusian Isles, described by Diodorus thus: 12l
The island is only moderately fertile, possessing little land
that is suitable for the vine; but it has olive trees which are
engrafted upon the wild olive. And of all the products of the
island, they say the softness of its wool stands first in excellence. The island is broken up at intervals by notable plains
and highlands and has a city named Eresus, a colony of the Carthaginians. And it also possesses excellent harbors, huge wallS,
and a multitude of well constructed houses. The inhabitants consist of barbarians of every nationality, but Phoenicians preponderate.
This not only supplied produce and a market for trade, but
afforded a convenient stopover between New Carthage and the mother city.
Finally, Carthage possessed the three key islands between Sicily and the African coast, a great advantage for her shipping,
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as Diodorus points out: 122
Off the south of Sicily three islands lie out in the sea,
and each of them possesses a city and harbors which can offer
safety to ships which are in stress of weather. The first one
is that called Melite ••• and it possesses many harbors which
offer exceptional advantages, and its inhabitants are blessed
in their possessions ••• This island is a colony planted by the
Phoenicians, who, as they extended their trade to the western
ocean, found in it a place of safe retreat, since it was well
supplied with harbors, and layout in the open sea.
This was the island of Malta, a valuable base in the Carthaginian empire, as it has been to the British. Just above it lies
the island now called Gazo, the second in the chain from Carthage to Sicily. Diodorus describes it: 12311 After this island
[Mal tal there is a second which bears the name of Gaulas, lying
out in the open sea and adorned with well-situated harbors, a
Phoenici an c 01 ony. II
Last of all, there was the island of Cercina, now Kerkenna,
lying along the African coast below the Carthaginian peninsula.
"Next comes Cercina, facing Libya, which has a modest city and
most serviceable harbors which have accommodations not only for
merchant vessels, but even for ships of war.,,124
Thus, a ship coming from the eastern Mediterranean would have
to pass through this chain of Carthaginian possessions, a passage which, unless Carthage allowed it by treaty, involved evident danger from the nation who, as Strabo mentions on the
authority of Eratosthenes,125"used to drown in the sea any foreigners who sailed past their country to Sardinia or to the
Pillars."

102
Last of all, in regard to the island of Sicily, of which
much has been said already, we must be content with the general
appraisal of Diodorus, who calls it "the richest of the islands",126and of Strabo, who asks: 127l1 As for the fertility of
the country, why should I speak of it, since it is on the lips
of all men, who declare that it is no whit inferior to Italy?
And in the matter of grain, honey, saffron, and certain other
products, one might call it even superior."
Because of its proximity, and because it threatened to harbor a rival Greek trade center, the Carthaginians were interested in Sicily at an early date; in fact their first recorded
overseas expedition was sent there about 550 B.C. under the
general Malchus, as Justinus recalls; he was defeated, however,
when he attempted to carry the war into Sardinia: 128 "Propter
quod ducem suum Malchum, cuius auspiciis et Siciliae partem

c'

domueran t ••• exsulare jus serunt. It The hi st ory of Carthage from
that time to the Punic wars is the history of her struggle with
the Sicilian Greeks under Gelon, Dionysius, Timoleon, and Agathocles. Through it all she managed to maintain at least a foothold in the western part, and at times almost succeeded in subjugating the island completely. It was her growing power in
Sicily, finally, that threatened the Romans and brought on the
First Punic war.
Sicily was one of the most valuable of the Carthaginian
possessions. Her cities and colonies in the west enabled Car-
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thage to command the sea; the produce of Sicily supplied her
with support for her armies; the skill of Sicilian Greek worklnen gave her articles of trade and a coinage to carryon that

trade; finally, the subject peoples of Sicily paid her tribute,
as is seen in the terms after the successful campm gn of 405
B.C., quoted by Diodorus: 129
Peace was concluded on these terms: The Carthaginians were
to hold subject, besides their ancient colonies, the Siconi,
the Silenuntii, the peoples of Agrigentum and Himera. In addition, the citizens of Gela and Camarina could remain in their
cities after tearing down the walls, but must pay tribute to
the Carthaginians.
These advantages made Sicily well worth fighting for; when
the island vvas lost, a wedge was driven into the heart of the
Carthaginian empire.
The empire of Carthage, then, can be divided into three
groups of territory: (1) The African coast of the Mediterranean
from the subject city of Leptis on the east to the Pillars and
beyond, including Carthage herself and the vicinity immediately
under her dominion. (2)

Sp~n,

particularily Gades and New Car-

thage. (3) The islands of the Mediterranean from Malta to the
Pillars. We have tried to indicate the advantages that Carthage
reaped from these vast holdings in trade and tribute, in precious metals, from Spain and Africa, in man power for her armies
in agricultural produce for her support. It is not surprising
that at the head of such an empire, Carthage should be the
wealthiest city of antiquity.
But if the Carthaginians built up this empire entirely for
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their own selfish interests, what held it together? A number of
influences may be mentioned:
(1) Many of the dependencies of Carthage were her own colonies, the nucleus of the settlement being Carthaginians, or at
least Liby-Phoenicians, sent out originally from Carthage in the
colonizing expeditions mentioned by Aristotle to relieve Carthage of superfluous population and to enrich the colonists.
They were attached to Carthage therefore by ties of blood, and
probably maintained an ascendancy in the surrounding country by
their connection with the powerful mother city.
(2) Carthaginian arms forced submiSSion, as, for example, in
Sicily, where a garrison was maintained in the Carthaginian
settlements to

s~ppress

revolts, to enforce treaty stipulations,

or to push the interests of Carthage. The garrison at Motya
which resisted Dionysius' first revolt may be cited, or that
already mentioned as forming part of the population of New Carthage.
(3) The fact that Carthage was complete mistress of the western Mediterranean and jealous of all foreign trade would enforce
the loyalty of the merchant classes throughout the empire, since
they could not hope to find secure markets or transportation
without her approval.
(4) There was a common coinage to form another commercial bon
between Carthage and her dependents. In fact a sort of bank note
made of leather, corresponding to modern paper money, was issued
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to facilitate trade. 130
(5) Finally, religion formed a common bond, the religion
which the Carthaginians had taken from their Phoenician ancestors and which they passed on to their colonies in turn. There
was a famous temple of the Phoenician Heracles at Gades, for example, erected by the Phoenicians long before Carthage took
over. Diodorus speaks of it!31 "In the city they built many
works appropriate to t he nature of the region, and among them
a costly temple of Heracles, and they instituted magnificent
sacrifices which were conducted after the manner of the Phoenicians." And Polybius" describing New Carthage,,132 mentions that
on the largest of its hills "is built a temple of Aesculapius,"
while another eminence "is known as the hill of saturn." Both
references recall the cult of Aesculapius and of Moloch in -the
mother city.
What was the a tti tude of subject nations to the head of the
empire? Those cities which she had founded and which shared her
civilization and culture remained loyal" like Motya and New Carthage; among peoples whom Carthage had subjugated" however"
there seems to have existed a chronic state of disaffection and
rebellion.
The hatred of the Libyans manifested in the Mercenary Revolt
after the first struggle with Rome has been mentioned. This attitude among the Africans was of long standing. Their hatred
was old when in 396 B.C. Bemi1co further exasperated them by
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deserting the troops they supplied him in Sioily. Diodorus declares:133 "When, Indeed, that disaster was made known throughout Libya, those who had assisted the Carthaginians in war,
though they had long hated the burden of their domination, now
beoause of the betrayal of the troops at Syraouse burned with a
JIluoh greater hatred against them." About 379 B.C. this hatred
among the Afrioans had broken out into a revolt whioh threatened
to overwhelm Carthage while she was

we~k

from plague. The Sardi-

nians, seizing the opportunity, followed their example, as Diodorus reoords: 134
It happened a little later that the plague fell upon Carthage
whioh, inoreasing more and more, oarried off many of the Carthaginians and they almost lost the empire. For the Libyans, being
disaffeoted, revolted, while the Sardinians, considering this a
good opportunity, oonspired against Carthage and threw off her
yoke.
As early as 310 B.C. Agathocles counted upon this rebellious
disposition when he dared the invasion of Africa. Diodorus
writes: 135 "He hoped ••• that their allies, groaning under Carthaginian demands for so long, would seize the opportunity to
revolt." It is evident, then, that the hatred of Carthage burning among her subject neighbors was literally centuries old.
This hatred is explained partially, as has been said, by the
heavy tribute demanded from the Libyans, and by the manner in
which they were betrayed while fighting for Carthage in Sicily.
Diodorus adds a third reason: 136 ·
At the conclusion of the Libyan war, the Carthaginians avenged themselves upon the nation of the Mioatani Numidians, inCluding women and children, by crucifying all who fell into
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their hands. Wherefore their descendants, remembering the cruelty worked upon their fathers, remained the most bitter enemies
of Carthage.
In Sicily much the same hostile attitude prevailed among the
subject states of Carthage. When Dionysius planned his first attempt to free Sicily from the Carthaginian rule, in 397 B.C., he
found the citizens of Syracuse ready to join him, for, as DiodorUS

explains,137 "they desired the war no less than he, primari-

ly because they hated the Carthaginians." The other Sicilians
supported the revolt, "for although they dreaded the domination
of Dionysius, still they willingly joined in the war against
Carthage, incited by the cruelty of the Carthaginians. And for
the same reason, when Dionysius openly took up arms, those who
dwelt in the Greek cities under the dominion of Carthage manifested their hatred of the Phoenicians. 1t138 Finally, all the
subsequent history of the island until it came into Roman hands
is a repetition of this attempt to be free of Carthaginian domination.
The Sicilians had many reasons for hating Carthage. The Carthaginian conquests had been attended with terrible barbarities;
they massacred the people, stripped the Cities, imposed tribute
upon their children. More fundamental still, the Greeks cherished an inborn love of freedom and a contempt for the Carthaginian
"barbarian lt • They could not live content under Carthaginian rule
because, as A. J. Church remarks,139 "Carthaginian habits and
ways of life seem to have been particularily offensive to the
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taste of the Greeks." We shall understand their attitude more
clearly when we understand the religion of the Carthaginians.
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I.

References to Greek Authors
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7 Ibid.:
a.pxo~hl1J<; oe 'tTj<; n!J.epa) e'tepou~ 6.X!J.frt~ exa.'A.el 'te'tpaxlqXtito"'t ot lotov'te~ lepav Ano'A.Aoovo~ od ~o 'te aya~a xa'taxpuoov
~v xa~ o~a a6't~ xpuo~'A.a'tov ana X''A.f~v 'ta'A.a.v't~v o'taa~oG xeplexe l'tO •••

8 Appian VIII~128:

xat

'tP'~v

01

e~oopo~o,

o6o~v 6.xa 'tTj~ 6.yopa<; 6.voo~v e<; a6't~v, OrXial xuxvat
nav'taxoaev ~oav •••
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17 XIII,90:

.

'~iAxa~ ~a lepa xat ~a~ olxta~ aUATIaa~, xat ~1AO~r~W~ ~peu
v~C1a~, ~oaa<hTIv W~~Ae,o.v auvf)epol0ev, -~oT)v etxa<; ~o~'v eOXT)xeyaL ~OA'V oixou~evT)v U~~ avopoov efxoal ~uplaOwv, a~ope~ov
o~ a~a ~~~ x~roew<; yeyev~~~v~v, xAoua,~a~~v O~ oxeoav ~wv ~6~e
'EAAT)VtOwV ~6Aewv yerev~evT)v. xo.t ~au~a ~oov ~v a6~~ ~lAO
xaAT)aeV~Wv el~ xo.V~Olav xo.~aaxeuaa~a~wv xoAu~eAelo.v. xo.t ydp
I»'
,
el<;
o.xpov ex~e~oVT}~eval,
xo.l• 1I:o.V~or~v av~p,av~wv ~'Ao~exvw~ oeo~~,oup~~evwv u1I:epaywv aple~O,.
~a ~~v.ouv 1I:OAU~eAea;a~a ~oov e~ywv a1l:ea~e'Aev e[~ KapXTJOova
(~y
or<; xo.t ~~v ~Aap,Oo<; auve~T) xo~,ae~va, ~aupov).
~

ypa~a,

~

N

~o.~~I\,~eel<;

"

T)upee~ao.v

18 XIII 96:

of 5! KapXT)oOV10I ~e~a ~~v aAw01V ~~~ ~oAew~ ~a ~~v avae~
xo.t ~o~, avoplav~a<; xaf ~aAAa ~a 1I:OAU~eAea~a~a ~e~~veyxo.v

~a~a

er,

KapX~Oova.

19 XIII,108:

~wv 0' iepwv oa,o, W~ xo.1JJ~ 01t~ ~ou 1I:Up~' ~ooxet 6'e~eapeo."
~a, YAU~a, xar ~a 1I:ePl~O~epw, e[pyo.a~eva 1I:ePlexO~eV.

20 Ibid.:

~xov~wv o~ ~wv re~V ex~~, ~~l 1I:OAeW, 'A1I:OAAWVO~ avop,av'ta
a~oopo. ~~yo.v, aUA~aav~e, au~av a1l:ea~e'Aev ef, ~~v Tupo.v.

xo.Axouv

21 Mora1ia,200b:

a1l:o

e~ 't~v 1I:OA'V7avoplav~wv
!'X1Ata~ ~ea~~v ouao.v •••

eupwv

'EAAT)V1XWV xat

avaeT)~a~wv

22 VIII,133:

~, 6~ .z1xt7~tav ~ep,e1l:e~~evJ ~aa. KapXT)oOV10l a<pwv avo.efl~o.~a
1I:OAe~OUv~e, eAo.~ov, eA8ov'ta, e1l:1y,yv~axe,v xat xo~i~eaea.,.

xOlv4

23 XVII 3 15:

.evOl~~

O'aV

~G6T)AO' ~ 6uva~I<; a.u~oov ex ~oJ ua~a~ou 1I:OA~~OU,

ev,~ xa.~eAUeT)aaV u1l:a ~Xl~(WVO' 'tou At~'A'a.VOU, xo.f ~ nOAI,
QPOT)V ~~o.vlaaT). ~~e yap up~av~o ~oAe~erV ~ou~ov ~~v 1I:OAe~OV,
1I:OAe" ~!v e!xov 'tplaxoato.<; €V 't~ A'~U~, avep~1I:wv o'ev ~~
1I:OAei ~uplaoo., e~oo~~ov~o.. 1I:OA'OpXou~evot o~ xo.t avayxo.aeev-
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25 ,
VIII
82:, ...
,1
,
"~,
I,
H
H
Xa.t AOYOV a.U'tOlC;; 5t50v'tec;; w) T} ~ev It:OAtC;; eO''tlV a.~VOlt:AOC;; epT}~OC;;, ou Vo.Uv, ou Xa.'tUlt:EA'tT}V, OU ~eAoc;;. 00 ~l~O) EXOUO'o., oox
cL.v5pa.C;; oixelouc;; rxa.vooc;; a.'J{o~a.xeO'eo.t 'J{ev'te ~upto.5wv €va.yxoC;;
5te~ea.p~EvWV, •••

113

!v eCp~v~ ~~AOXpOYt~ ~ea~paoplx6~wv yey~~~~wY a~eoYiay. ~ o!
Xwpa ~ ~~y ~v a~~eAO~O~O~, ~ O! eAal0~6po~, xat ~~v 4AAWY ~~y
xap~r~WV OeYOQWY aVa~AeW~.
e~t ea~tpa O! ~ep~ ~~ ~eoiov eve~ov~o ~o~v ayeA"1 xat ~Of~yal, xat ~a ~A~arOY lA~ ~Op,aOwy
r~~WV tye~e. XaeOAOO O! ~"V~ota ~l' ~V !V ~Or~ ~6nOl~ e~Oa,
~OYta, ~~V tnt~ayea~a~Wv KapX~Oovtwv atelA~~6~ooy ~a~ x~~ael~,
~oi~ ~AOU~O"
~e~'AoxaA~O~OOv ~p~~ a~6Aaualv. o,6nep ot
ZtXeA,~al ~~ ~e ~~, x~pa, xaAAO' xat ~~v e~Oal~ovtav ~~v tv
a6~ti eao~a~ov~e, •••

xat

29

:xx

17:

~a, ~~aaa, O! ~oAe"

~Aefoo, ~wv OLaxoatwv xexelpw~evo, •••

36 XXXVIII 7:
ev xavo~A(~, xop~optOa aaAa~~tav ex'xenopx~eyo,.
37 XXXVIII 8:
~ O! ~aAt; e~exope6e~o ~e~a ~eyaA~' a~ta, ev ~ti nop~opio,

~ti ~avoxAt~ ~ao~v, ~a~e ~o~, ~y ~ar, ~p~~ora"
~OAU ~, ~poao~etAelv.

~opavvou,

xat

38 VIII,66:

xop~upav noO~p~ xep'xei~evo,

xpoaou •••

xat

~eA,a

xat

~pe~~a a~~

40 XVI 2.25:
~e~a~~ O! ~~, .~~, xat TUpoU e,vwo~~ alYlaAO'

~epwy ~nv uaAi~,v 4~~ov·
ev~auea ~!v
xO~laae,aav er, Z,Owva ol ~~v xwveTav

ea~lv ~

ouv ~aal ~~ xeiaea.l,
Oexeaeal_

42 Po1i;ics VII,2,6:
ev !v[~ y4p xat VO~o, ~'ve, etal ~apo~uvov~e, ~po, ~~v

ape~~v ~au~~v.

xa.eanep ev

Kapx~06v, ~a.at ~ov

ex

~~v

xptxwv
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46 Po1lbius, I 72:

a~alpou~eVal ~Av xoo~ov eCoE~epov 6xpo~aoto~w~ et~ ~o~~
bvwv l ao~ou ~ •
47 VII,165:

••• ~~~ye ~~' a6~~v ~av xpovov ~ou~ov ~OlVtxwV xat A'~uWV
xat 'I~~QWV xat A'~WV xat 'EAtGUXWV xat ~ap60vtwv xat Kuevtoov ~pl~ov~a ~up,a6a~ xat a~p-a~Dyav a6~oov '~tAxav ~av Avvwvo~, KapXD60vtwv ~ov.,a. ~acnAea.

49 XIII 54:

eTxe 6l'~0~~ o6~~av~a~ 'Avvt(?ac;, w~ lJ.lv "'E~opo~ 6.veypalJle,

~e~oov l-LuQla6a, eixoal, f~~er, 6l ~e~paxlaXrA'OU~·
~DOlV, ou XOA~ xAetou~ ~oov 6exa ~upla6wv.

51 Ido"

XV,15;

0 6l

Tr~alo,

xpoopw~evo, 6 ~~~Qovw, ~a ~eyeeo~ ~ou XOA€~OU, ~oov ~e
~wv ~o~, euee~ou, xa~eAeyov a~pa~l~a,.

XOAl-

115

"'It31Jpec;, Ke'A~lsf'A'Allvec; 50558 I 67:

~~ 5~ ~EYLO~OV ~EPOC; ao~wv ~V Ai~uec; ••• n'Aeioc; ov~ec; ~wv 5l0\lup t CJ)V.

60 Id." XV,II:

o

5-rrAvvr~ac; '1;<1 ~~v eTJpta np~ miollC; 't"'; 5uva.~eCJ)t;, oV't"a
~wV,by50Dx0v't"a, ~e'l;a 5~ ~a5~a 'l;0~~ ~La~o~Opo~C; ene~lT)oe,

\lUPlOUC; oV'I;ac; xaL 5",.Xl'Ar·OUC; ~av 6:.pLe~OV. O"~Ol
O~rVOl, Ke'A't"ot, Ba'Alapeic;, MaupouoLOL. 't"ou~CJ)v 5~

n'Aet(a)
nept
5 f)oav AlYOXG'I;O~'V xapev-
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epaAe ~o~, ~tXWprou, Ar~ua, xat Kapx~oovCou~, e~t o~ ~aa, ~o~,

&~ aI~aAta, ~ov~a, ~ee'au~ou~ ~AerOV ~ a~aolov a~oa~~aa, ~wv
~po~e~ay~~vwv. ~a o~ xepa~a Ola ~Wy f~~ewy Da~aAraa~o, eet, e~f
~~v ~a AalaV ~ou, au~~axou, No~aoa" e~t o~ ~3 oe~laV ~ou, ~wY
Kapx~OOYCOOV f~~erc.

61 VI~52:
••• ~a o~ ~ept ~a, ~e~lXa, xpeta, ~OAU o~ ~l 'pw~aro, ~pa, ~a
~fA~lOV aaxouol Kapx~oovrwv. of ~~v yap ~~v OA~Y ~ept ~ou~o
~010UY~&' a~ouoTIY, Kapx~o6v,o, o~ ~wv ~~y ~e~LXWY e[, ~eAO' bAlywpOUal, ~WY o'f~x'xwv ~paxerav ~,ya ~o,ouv~a, ~pOYOLav. a1~lov
ol ~Ou~wv ea~rv o~, ~evlxar, xat ~,aeo~6po" xpwv~a, ouva~ea"
'pw~aro, ot eyxwpto"
xat XoA'~Lxar,.
62 VIII,82:

63 ~.~VIII,93; vd. supra Ch. II, note 41.
64 Id.,VIII~108:
~WV o'{Aapxwv of ~!v auv ~or, au~wv ~6~o~6A~aay, xat eye,
"
vov~o ~~v~e, e, OlaxoalOU~ xaL OlaXlAlOU, l~~ea,.

..•

~,

~

~,

67 I 35:
••• Kapx~oovtou~~o~ nAeta~~v eaxov vau~lxDv ouva~lv •••
68 VI 52:
••• ~~ ~!v ~po, ~a, xa~a eaAa~~av, o~ep eix6" a~etvov aa~OOOl xat ~apaaxeua~ov~a, KapXDoov,O' OLa ~O xat ~a~plo, a6~or,
Iv~apxe,v ex ~aAa,ou ~DV e~~eLp,aV ~a6~~v xat eaAa~~o6pyerv ~a
Alo~a ~av~wv avepw~wv •••

69 XVI):,~ 19:
,
7
~~~r b
~pa~OageV~' KOlVOV ~tv elyal ~Or~ ~ap~apOl) ~aa,v

~eo, ~~V SeV~AaataV •••• KapX~6ovtoo, 6t Ka~a~Oy~OUY, el ~"
~eVWy e'~ Zap6~ ~apa~AeUaeleV ~ ent Z~~Aa,.
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~OOV

72 Timo1eon XXV:

'EV ~oij~~

oi

KapX~66y,o, Ka~a~Aeooa,v et, ~O A1Au~alov ayov~e,

tn~d ~upla6a, a~pa~ou Kat ~Pl~P&') 61aKoata, Kat ~AOra xtAla
xo~t~OY~~ ~~xav4, xat ~e9p,~~a xal ar~ov a~oyov xat ~~y 'aAA~V
1Lapaaxe:u~y

•••

76 I 61:

af ~~y y~ v~e:) ye~oua~l 6u~XPTIa~w, 6l€XelV~O ~po, ~ov xtvBuvov, ~a 6l nA~pw~a~a ~eAew, ~v ~yaax~a xat npo, Kalpov e~~e
~A~~€Va, ~d 6' lXl~a~1Xa veoauAAoya xat np~6ne,pa naa~~ Kaxonaget~, Kat nav~o, 6elvou •
•• •~axew, €Aet ~e~aay, xat xev~Tp<.Ov~a ~~v a6~oov vau, Ka~e6uaav
e~6o~Dxov~a 6' eaAwaav au~av6pOl.
82 Polyb.,XV,18:

~a ~axp~ ~AOra ~apa6ouyat xay~a ~A~V

6tKa

~Pl~PWV,

•••
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84 X;;.V 41:

WG av ~POG ~o~G buva~w~cr~ou~ ~wv xa~a ~~v 'Eupw~~v ~{~Awv

oLaywv{~EcreaL.
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lV,~LXE~~~, ~"Kapx~~6vL2L ~XdeXo~aL, ~at ~v Kapx~b6vL Kdv~a

naL KOLEL~W xaL KW~EL~W oau xat ~~ nOAL~U e~Ea~LV.

93 1,72; cf. Ch. II, nota 16.

97 VI 2:
boxouaL bl ~OL xat ~O'VLXE~, ~~ '1~~ECav lx noAAOU ea~LVa
lrr' ~~nopC~ bLarrAlov~E~, olx~aaC ~Lva ~~~ 'I~~pCa~, •••

99T III ' ,2 ' 13: I

OU~OL

yap

~OLVL~LV

u ,EyEVOV~O

OU~W~

I

Is..

a~oupa

_~
I
UKOXELPLOL,

U

wa~E

120
~aj
~n

nAE{OU b ~WV l~ ~~ Toupo~~uv{~ n6AEwv XUL ~WV nA~crCov ~6nwv
tXECVWV V~V O~XE~creU~.

101 VI,5:
nuuo~lvou o~ ~ou nOAl~ou, ••• ~6VOb ~v txl cr~pu~w, XUL ~ov
XDOEcr~~V ~Acropo~~uv EXWV ot cruv6v~a, OL~AeEV txt r&6ELP.U r XUL
~ov nope~~v lb,~I~~p{uv xEpacru b lAE~A&~EL ~a ~I~~pwv o~oev dOLxo~v~wv, u~op~~v

••••

121

108 III 2 10:

rrOA~~L~~'Oe, ~wv nepl Kapx~06va Neav dpyupelwv ~v~aee{',

~eYLa~a ~&V elva! ~~aL, oLeXeLV 0& ~~, ~6AeW' oaov eLXOaL a~a
blouG, nEp'LELA~~~a X~XAOV ~e~paxoa{wv a~ao'wv! ono~ ~e~~apa,
~upLaoa, dvepw~v ~eVeLV ~wv lp1a~o~evwv, dva~lpov~aG ~6~e ~~
o~~ ~wv tPw~a'wv

XLAta, opax~aG. .
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123 V,12:

~e~a be ~a~~~v ~~v v~cr6v ~cr~Lv ~~epa ~~v ~ev ~poo~yop(av
exouga ra~~o~, ne~ay'a be xat ~L~ecrLv e~xa(poL~ xexocr~~~ev~,
¢OLVLXWV anoLxo~.

,.
"
1toi\I..V
, , exo'Ucra
e~nopoq;,

125 XVII,l,19:

••• Kapx~box(06~ be xa~a1tov~oUV, et ~L~ ~wv ~evwv eC~ ~apbw

rrapa1t~e~creLev ~ ~n!.. ~~~~a~.

126 V", 2 ; . " ,

••• ene!.. xa!..

,

xpa~Lcr~~ ~wv v~crwv

~"

~cr~L

•••
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132 X 10:
•••

.1 "

e~

7
ayopeue~aL

'So.
" A ox~~nLou
\
.. • •••
ouT xa eLupu~aL
vewG

K'
~povou.

0t

0
uSo. v~,
~pL~OG npo -

133 XIV 77:
~DG yap ou~~opaG oLax~~Uxee£o~G xa~a ~~v AL~~~V ot o~~~a~oL,
xaL naA.aL ~ev ~Loo6v~eG ~o ~&po~ ~fjG ~wv Kapx~oov£wv ~ye~ovLaG,
~~e oe oLa ~~v ~wv o~pa~Lw~wv EV Zupaxo~oaLG npooooCav XOA.~
~aA.A.ov i~lxauoav ~O xa~' a~~wv ~too~.

~'{, 24 t

..,..
. . , IT
vooou ~OLG xa~OLXOUOL ~~v .ap¥~uova
YEvo~lv~" xat ~fj, vooou noA.A.~v In'~aoLv lxo~o~G" nOA.A.OL ~WV
Kapx~oovLWV oLe~6ap~oav, xat ~~v ~1e~ovCav tXLvoUvEuoav &no~af..etv
or ~e yap AC~ueG xa~a~povnoav~eG au~wv, dnlo~~oavt ot oe ~~v
~ap06va xa~oLxo6v~eG, vo~{oav~eG lxetv xaLpov %a~a ~wv Kaex~oo
vlwv, dnlo~~oav dn' a~~wv, xat ou~~pov~oov~eG dnleev~o ~OL~
13:

~e~a

ue

~au~a

\

So. ,

~OL~LX~~

Kapx~bovloLG.

135 xx,3:
~f..nL~e ~ou~
%a~a ~ryv AL~~ryv ou~~&xouGt ~aeuva~lvouG ~otG
rrpoo~ay~aoL lx nOA.NWV xpovwv, A~teoeaL xaLpov ~~G dnoo~&oew~.

be

· 125
..

~~G

I

ELG

.\

~ov,

L

na~cpaG

II

w~o~~~o~

I

.L

ava~L~vr,crxU~EvoL,

Kapx~bov'OL~ 1toAl~LOL xaeEcr~~xELcrav.

i

I

xa~Emw~a~oL

..

~OL~

II. References to Latin and English Authors

lI,420ff.:
Miratur molem Aeneas, magalia quondam,
miratur portas strepitumque et strata viarum.
Instant ardentes Tyrii, pars ducere muros,
molirique arcem et manibus subvolvere saxa,
pars optare locum tecto et concludere sulco.
Hic portus alii effodiunt; hic alta theatris
fundament a locant alii, immanisque columnas
rupibus excidunt, scaenis decora alta futuris.
441:
Lucus in urbe fuit media, laetissimus umbra.
446:
Hic templum Iunoni ingens Sidonia Dido
condebat, donis opulentum et numine divae,
aerea cui gradibus surgebant limina, nexaeque
aere trabes, fori bus cardo stridebat aenis.
453 :
Namque sub ingenti lustrat dum singula templo
reginam opperiens, dam, quae fortuna sit urbi,
artificumque manus inter se operumque laborem
miratur, videt Iliacas ex ordine pugnas,
bellaque iam fama totum volgata per orbem ..•
5 Cf. Smith, 434.
10 Cf. T. H. Bindley in the introduction to his edition of
Tertullian's Apologeticus Adversus Gentes pro Christianis, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1889, xi: 1tDUring t'F.i'e"perlod 01' its independence Carthage had possessed on the suwnit of Byrsa a
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CHAPTER IV

MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL CULTURE
I. Introduction
When Bosworth Smith says that "the most important factor in
the history of a people,- especially if it be a Semetic peopleis its religion,,,l he states a truth which Polybius implicitly
accepted when, comparing Rome and Carthage, he wrote: 2 "But the
quality in which the Roman commonwealth is most distinctly superior is, in my opinion, the nature of their religious convictions." Religion is at once the characteristic of a people, the
guage of' their culture, and, often, the ultimate explanation of
their differences with other people. Religion determines their
outlook and eventually their action; it follows the rise and
fall of government and of other elements of culture, being found
at its purest and best when they have reached their peak; and
the answer it gives to the fundamental questions of life will
account for otherwise inexplicable enmities with other nations,
since these questions form the ultimate basis of agreement or
dissension among men. Knowing the religion of Carthage, then, we
shall hold the key to ,her culture, her development, and her relations with the other nations of the ancient world.
Fortunately, the sources provide sufficient information to
enable us to trace in broad outline the development of this important phase of Carthaginian culture, although the facts thin
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out as we approach the time of the Punic Wars. It will be useful, however, to watch the development of moral culture through
the early history of Carthage, inasmuch as this will manifest
her moral background, determine her moral condition at the peri",(
od of the wars with Rome.
II. The Gods of Carthage
The gods of Carthage were the gods of their Phoenician ancestors, and the Carthaginians through most of their history maintained close relations with Tyre in matters of religion. It is
a bewildering task, however, to attempt to determine the exact
hierarchy of the divinities in the original Phoenician system.
The matter is further complicated by the fact that Greek and
Roman writers, in speaking of the Carthaginian deities, apply to
them the names of corresponding gods and goddesses in their own
system rather than the proper Phoenician titles. Quintus Curtius
Rufus, for example, refers to Moloch under the title of Saturn,3
while Plutarch calls r~m Cronos. 4 We will be content, then, to
mention the most important divinities worshipped at Carthage,
giving to each that emphasis which the sources themselves seem
to justify, without attempting to disentangle the complex system
of which they were a part. 5
The chief deity worshipped at Carthage, or at least the one
most closely associated with Carthaginian religion in the minds
of the ancients, was Baal or Moloch, called by the Romans saturn
and by the Greeks Cronos. He waw identified with the sun and wit
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fire, as his worship will indicate, and must have been regarded
as a malignant power by the Carthaginians themselves, for he
was propitiated by the cruel rites of which Justinus speaks in
beginning his account of the Carthaginians: 6
Cum inter caetera mala etiam
rorum religione, et scelere pro
homines ut victimas immolabant;
hostium mis~ricordiam provocat)
sanguine eorum exposcentes, pro
solent.

peste laborarent, cruenta sacremedio usi sunt; quippe
et impuberes (quae aetas etiam
aris admovebant, pacem deorum
quorum vita dii rogari maxime

This element above all others impressed the Romans and
Greeks and, to their minds, characterized Carthaginian religion,
perhaps even Carthage herself, as is manifest in frequent references like that of Dionysius of Halicarnasus: 7 "It is said also
that the ancients sacrificed human victims to Saturn, as was
done at Carthage while that city stood." It deserves, therefore,
a separate section of its own.

Scholars agree that Baal-Moloch

had a more noble aspect as god of the life-giving sun, yet whenever he appears in the history of Carthage it is to preside over
some national excitement,- a grave crisis or wild exaltationand to be propitiated with sacrifices of the kind mentioned
above.
Baal-Moloch, the sun god, had his feminine counterpart in the
goddess of the moon,- "the Phoenicians' goddess; Astarte the
people of Sidon call her." 8

She was the "heavenly Aphrodite"

to whom Herodotus refers, in the manner of the Qreeks, when he
speaks of the temple founded in her honor by the Phoenicians on
Cythera: 9 "And the temple on Cythera was founded by Phoenicians
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from the same land of Syria." She was Venus Caelestis, or simply
Caelestis, to Latin writers like St. Augustine, who asks: 10
!lVI/hat had now become of Caelestis, whose empire was once so
great in Carthage?" She, too,

ha~

a beneficent aspect, being

goddess of the night and the giver of rain,-"virgo Caelestis,
pluviarum pollicitatrix," as Tertullian calls her;ll yet it was
rather under the aspect of the "heavenly Aphrodite", goddess of
love, that she was worshipped, and her cult, at Carthage, as in
other parts of the Phoenician empire, consecrated immorality.
Identified with her in later times, at least as a subordinate
goddess, was Dido or Elissa, the traditional foundress of Carthage, of whose worship Justinus writes: 12 "Quam diu Carthago
invicta fuit, pro dea culta est.1t
The Byrsa at Carthage, and the highest hill of New Carthage,
were topped with temples dedicated to Aesculapius (Asclepius),
as has been noted. From this it appears that he was recognized
as the particular patron of Carthage and her colonies. He was
not known to the Carthaginians, of course, as Asclepius, which
was a Greek identification, but as Eshmun; he is said to have
been the most famous of a family of deities called the Cabeiri,
the sons of the Phoenician god Pataicus (identified with the
Greek hephaestus and Egyptian Ptah) who were "the makers of the
world, the founders of civilization, and the inventors of ships
and medicine." 13 They were represented as dwarfs. Pataicus,
the father, was cUltivated at old and New Carthage too; his
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image was used as a figurehead for ships; Herodotus mentions
among other details 14 that "the image of Hephaestus
Memphis)

(at

is most like to the Phoenician Pataici, which the

Phoenicians carryon the prows of their triremes •.• it is in
the likeness of a dwarf." Then speaking of the images of the
Cabeiri, he says:15 "These also are like the images of Hephaestus, and are said to be his sons." That Pataicus was cultivated
at New Carthage may be inferred from the fact that one of the
city's hills was dedicated to him, along with one to Cronos
(Moloch) and- characteristic notel- another to the discoverer
of the nearby silver mines. Polybius remarks: 16
The three other smaller eminences are to the north of the
city, the most easterly being called the hill of Hephaestus,
the next one the hill of Aletes, who is said to have received
divine honors for his discovery of the silver mines, while the
third is known as the hill of Cronos.
Melcarth, or Baal Tsur, the "Baal of Tyre", was rendered a
special homage by the Carthaginians as the patron of the parent
city, Tyre, and the protecting genius of the Phoenician colonies
~e

is the "Phoenician Heracles" to the Greeks, and his temple at

Tyre has been briefly described by Herodotus: 17 "I took ship to
Tyre in Phoenice, where I heard that there was a very holy
temple of Heracles. There I saw it, richly equipped with many
other offerings, besides that in it were two pillars, one of
refined gold, one of emerald, a great pillar that shone in the
night time."
Later Herodotus visited another temple of the same god at

133

Thasos:1 8 "Then I went to Thasos, too, where I found a temple
of Heracles, built by the Phoenicians.,"
Finally, at the other end of tbe Mediterranean, on the island
of Gades, the Phoenicians, as Diodorus says, 19

.t buil t

many work:::

appropriate to the nat-lIre of the region, and among them a costl"J
temple of Heracles, and they instituted magnificent sacrifices
which were conducted after the manner of the Phoenicians."
Silius ltalicus describes the custom and priestly ritual connected w·i th this shrine :20
Further, those who are permitted and privileged to have
access to the inner shrine forbid the appr>oach of women, and are
careful to keep bristly seine away from the threshold. The dress
worn before the altars is the same for all; linen covers their
limbs, and their foreheads are adorned with a head band of
Pelusian flax. It is their custom to offer incense with robes
ungirt; and, following their fathers' rule, they adorn the garment of sacrifice with a broad stripe. Their feet are bare and
their heads shaven, and their bed admits no partner; the fires
on the hearth stones keep the altars alight perpetually. But no
statues or familiar images of the gods filled the place with
solemnity and sacred awe.
The absence of any image of the god, and purity of ritual
seems characteristic of the cult of Me1carth. There is only one
bit of evidence to the contrary; that is the reference of
Pliny 21 to "Hercules, to whom the Phoenicians each year sacrificed human victims.1f The cult of Me1carth also kept Carthage
in close relationship with Tyre, for it was customary to send a
tenth of the spoils taken annually to his temple in the parent
city. The earliest direct reference to religious practice in
the history of Carthage is the mention of this custom by Justinus 22 when he speaks of Carto10's meeting with his father, the
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general Malchus (550 B.C.) on his return from Tyre, "whither he
had been sent by the Carthaginians bearing the tithe of Heracles
from the spoils taken by his father in Sicily."
The Sicilian expeditions of 410-397 BC brought Greek gods to
Carthage. The adoption was occasioned by the utter disregard for
these very gods, manifested by the Carthaginian generals in
desecrating and plundering the Sicilian temples. The Greeks were
astounded by the insensibility of the Carthaginians in pillaging
unscrupulously those places which were, as a rule, respected
even by an enemy. Diodorus comments on their action after the
capture of Silenus thus: 23 "These barbarians surpass all others
in their savagery; where others will spare those who flee to
the sanctuaries, out of respect for the gods, the Carthaginians,
unlike their enemies, plunder the very temples themselves."
Again, after the fall of Himera, Diodorus relates 24 that the
Carthaginians "stripped the private homes of everything of value,
while Hannibal despoiled the temples and burnt them." Other
passages, too, have already' been quoted from the same author in
connection with the description of Carthage, telling of the
exspoliation of the Sicilian temples and the transfer of their
treasures to Africa in the expeditions of 410 and 406 BG. Finally, during the siege of Spracuse in 397, just before the beginning of the plague which brought the third expedition to disaster,

Ha~ilco

"seized the suburb of Achradina and plundered the

shrines of Demeter and Persephone," as Diodorus recounts. 25
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Shortly afterward he abandoned his troops and fled to Carthage
in defeat; this desertion, as we have seen, aroused the Libyans
to revolt, and Carthage herself was threatened with ruin. Diodorus relates the reaction that followed within the city:26
The gods were now obviously hostile to the Carthaginians, so
that at first they were terror stricken and begged the deity to
cease being angry; but soon religious panic seized the entire
city, as each person anticipated in imagination its subjugation.
They passed a decree therefore, resolving to propitiate by every
possible means the gods whom they had insulted, and although
they had never worshipped Persephone or Demeter before, now they
appointed the most prominent citizens as priests of their cult.
Then, after setting up statues of the goddesses with great
solemnity, they instituted sacrifices according to the customs
of the Greeks. Selecting the most cultivated Greeks in their
midst, they assigned them to the permanent service of the goddesses.
Thus, about 396 BO, the patron goddesses of Sicily came to be
established at Carthage. The revolt that threatened the city
soon subsided and this circumstance, probably attributed to the
influence of the new deities, must have given an even greater
impetus to their cult. Moreover, it has been suggested that the
golden statue of Apollo, housed in its elaborate shrine near
the Carthaginian forum, was brought from Sicily during these
expeditions; whether Apollo was adopted as a foreign god and
worshipped at Carthage, and Tyre, according to Greek ritual, or
whether he was simply identified with one of the aspects of the
sun god, Baal, is not certain. At any rate, there is no doubt
that the Greek gods now received honors at Carthage that they
had never been paid before.
Did their cult become so popular as to serj.ously rival that

136

f the traditional gods, - Baal-Moloch, Astarte, Melcarth? There
is no positive evidence for such a change. Yet, from the negative
aspect, we lmow that the strict worship of Melcarth and Moloch
had to be renewed at the end of the century when the Carthaginians were threatened by Agathocles and turned to these gods for
protection. It is evident, however, that their cult had certainly
never been abandoned. Diodorus records the ftreform" of Melcarth
worship at Carthage when Agathocles defeated her army and threatened her existence about 309 BC: 2 7
The Carthaginians, therefore, believed that this calamity had
been inflicted upon them by the gods, and adopted every means of
divine supplication. They thought that Heracles, the patron of
their colonies, was particularYly angry with them, and sent a
great sum of money and a considerable number of very valuable
votive offerings to Tyre. Since they were originally a Tyrian
colony tb.ey had been accustomed in former times to send a tithe
of their gains there to the god; later however, when they amassed
great wealth, and their revenues increased tremendously, they
sent very little, losing respect for the god. Moved to repentance
by this calamity, therefore, they became mindful once more of all
the gods of Tyre.
From the text it is evident then that the homage paid to MelGarth had fallen into neglect and had to be revived at this time.
We shall see later that the same was true of the

c~lt

of Moloch.

There is some basis, therefore, for suggesting that the Greek
gods imported from Sicily became the popular objects of Carthaginian worship at least during the latter half of the fourth
century.
With the invasion of Agathocles and the return to Moloch and
Melcarth, however, carthaginian religion settled back into its
original mold, and no evidence of further change 1s noted. vie
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may conclude then, that the religion of Carthage for the half
century before, and all through the Punic Wars, was characteristically Phownician, centered about the Moloch-Melcarth-Astal'te
triad. There is evidence to support this conclusion, though it
is scattered and unsatisfactory.
Melcarth continued to receive his customary homage from the
carthaginians. 8ilius Italicus depicts Hannibal as worshipping
him at Gades: 28 "Thereafter he worshipped at the altars of the
god who bears the club, and loaded them with offerings lately
snatched by the conqueror from the fire and smale of the citadel
of Saguntum." And Polybius mentions the fact that one of the
Carthaginian ships used to convey the customary tribute to Melearth at Tyre put in at the mouth of the Tiber about 264BC and
was hired to take Demetrius back to Syria: 29 "Finding a Carthaginian ship that had carried sacred offerings anchored at the
of the Tiber, he hired it. Such ships were specially se-

~outh

lected at Carthage for the conveyance of the traditional offering
of first fruits to their gods that the Carthaginians send to
~yre."
~ust

Thus the relation to Tyre and the offerings to Melcarth

have continued up to the destruction of the city.

Silius represents Hannibal as taking his famed oath against
the Romans at the altar of Dido, who, as we have said, was prob~bly

identified with Astarte (Tanit) and worshipped in one of the

~emples
~tion

on the Byrsa. Besides testifying to the continued vener-

of this goddess at the time of the Punic wars, this passage

13

is a typical Roman impression of Carthaginian religious rites in
,;eneral :30
In the center of Carthage stood a temple, sacred to tte
spirit of Elissa, the foundress, and regarded with hereditary
awe by the people. Round it stood yew trees and pines with their
melancholy shade, which hid it and kept away the light of
t,eaven •••• statues of mournful marble stood there,- Belus, the
founder of the race, and all the line descended from Belus ••••
There Dido herself was seated, at last united forever to
Sychaeus; and at her feet lay the Trojan sword. A hundred altars
stood here in order, sacred to the gods of heaven and the lord
of Erebus. Here the priestess with streaming hair and Stygian
garb calls up Acheron and the divinity of Henna's goddess. The
earth rumbles in the gloom and breaks forth into awesome hissings; and fire blazes unkindled upon the a,l tars. The dead also
are called up by magic spells and flit through empty space; and
the marble face of Elissa sweats. To this shrine Hannibal was
brought by his father's command; and when he had entered, Hamilcar examined the boy's face and bearing. No terrors for him had
the Massylian priestess, raving in her fren~y, or the horrid
rites of the temple, the blood bespattered doors, and the flames
that mounted at the sound of incantation.
Is the impression of cruel rites and gloomy mystery merely
the product of prejudice and poetic imagination? This mie::;ht be
conceded if we did not know the appalling reali.ty of Moloch
worship, whose chief feature was human sacrifice, propitiation
of the god

b~

burning human victims in his honor; and the

victims in which he especially delighted were well-born children.
III. Human Sacrifice
The Phoenician ancestors of Carthage had practiced this cruel
rite and passed it on with the rest of their religious system to
their colonies. The Carthaginians had made it so important a
part of their ritual that at an early date it became notorious
among other nations. About 490 B.C. Darius tried to use his
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influence to stop the practice, as Justinus records :3lltEnvoys
came to Carthage from

~arius,

king of the Persians, bearing a

communication which forbade the Carthaginians to immolate human
victims." Apparently the step was ineffective, for Plutarch tells
us 32 that about ten years later "Gelon, the despot of Syracuse ,
after vanquishing the Carthaginians off Himera, forced them when
he made peace with them to include in the treaty an agreement to
stop sacrificing their children to Cronos." Yet the rite seems
to have been

continue~,

at least in times of stress. During the

siege of Agrigentum in the Sicilian expedition of 406 B.C., the
plague carried off many of the Carthaginian troops, including
Hannibal, the general. His successor, Hamilco, regarded this as
a punishment because the Carthaginians had violated the tombs
outside the city, and accordingly sought to placate the gods with
sacrifice, as Diodorus relates: 33
When Hamilcar saw that the common soldiers were stricken with
religious fear, he put an end, first of all, to the violation of
the tombs. Then he sought to propitiate the gods according to
Carthaginian custom, sacrificing a chiln to Cronos and drowning
a number of victims in Poseidon's honor.'
There was a partial neglect of the worship of Moloch in the
years preceding the invasion of Agathocles, as Diodorus will
show, but this very neglect brings out the full horror of the
rites, for it consisted in a decline, not in the number, but in
the quality of the victims. The nature of the "revival" of
Moloch worship in 309 B.C. emphasises all the more the heartlessness and perversion of the worshippers. Diodorus describes the
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revival, and the details of the ritual thus: 34
They believed that Cronos was aroused against them too, because in former times they had sacrificed the sons of the aristocracy to that god, but later they bought children secretly,
and after raising them, sent them as victims for sacrifice. But
an investigation was held and some of the victims found to be
supposititious. With these in mind, they beheld the enemy encamp
ed at their gates and were filled with religious fear that the
worship of their ancestoral gods had been neglected. They hastened to rectify the carelessness by choosing out two hundred of
the noblest children and offering them in public sacrifice. No
less than three hundred others, yielding to reproach, offered
themselves of their own accord. There were at Carthage brazen
statues of Cronos fashioned with outstretched arms inclined at
an angle so that the children placed in them rolled down and
fell into the flaming hollow within.
Some details of this inhuman rite as practiced privately are
added by Plutarch: 35
With full knowledge and understanding they themselves offered
up their own children, and those who had no children wuld buy
little ones from poor people and cut their throats as if they
were so many lambs or young birds; meanwhile the mother stood
by without a tear or a moan; but should she utter a single moan
or let fall a single tear, she had to forfeit the money, and her
child was sacrificed nevertheless; and the whole area before the
statue was filled with a loud noise of flutes and drums so that
the cries of wailing should not reach the ears of the people.
Tertullian laments the heartlessness of the practice thus: 36
Cum propriis filiis Saturnus non pepercit, extraneis utique
non parcendo perseverabat, quos quidem ipsi parentes sui afferebant et libentes respondebant et infantibus blandiebantur, ne
lacrimantes immolarentur.
The ancients in these passages speak eloquently enough of the
horrible reality of Moloch worship. That they fully appreciated
its revolting nature is already evident from what has been said.
Plutarch's comment is: 37lf Would it not have been far better for
the Carthaginians to have taken Critias or Diagoras to draw up
their law code at the very beginning and so not to believe in
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any divine power or god, rather than to offer such sacrifices as
they used to offer to Cronos?"
The Carthaginians maintained this practice through the entire
course of their history with the possible exception of a single
period; it was neglected, as we have seen,- perhaps even discontinued for a time in the years before the invasion of Agathocles, the same time which saw the introduction of Greek gods and
the decline of IJlelcarth worship. There is probably a causal relation between these factors,- the introduction of Greek gods
and the decline of the Moloch-Melcarth cults. The Carthaginians
were always, for better or worse, a religious people; they were
Semetic, their names,- Hannibal, Hasdruba1.- had religious significance, they gloried in images, temples, and shrines, they
were strongly

influen~ed

by religious fear. If they neglected

their own gods, it was only because they had turned to those of
the Greeks. But then Agathocles appeared suddenly in Africa, defeated the Carthaginian troops, encamped close to the city. The
Carthaginians must have felt that the Greek gods had failed them,
or at least that something violent had to be done to pacify the
old gods whom they had neglected. Melcarth was loaded with offerings, and the sacrifice to Moloch renewed with a vengeance.
Shortly afterwards they gained a victory over Agathocles. Their
exaltation took the same form as their despair. Diodorus relates
that 38 "The Carthaginians after the victory were sacrificing the
noblest of their captives at night as thanks offerings to the
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gods, enveloping the victims with a great fire." Thus the practice of human sacrifice was renewed at this time never to be
abandoned until the destruction of the city. Quintus Cuntius,
speaking of the worship in general, says :39" Sacrum quoque, quod
quidem diis minime cordi esse crediderim, mu1tis secu1is intermissum repetendi auctores quidam erant, ut ingenuus puer Saturno
lmmolaretur, quod sacraligium verius, quam sacrum, Carthaginienses a conditoribus traditum usque ad excidium urbis suae fecisse
dicuntur."
Though there is little direct evidence of human sacrifice
among the Carthaginians at the time of the Punic Wars, statements like that of Curtius above leave no doubt that it still
prevailed. Silius Italicus alone presents a specific instance
as taking place at this time and, though the incident itself
may be fictitious, the practice in general was probably as he
describes it: 40
The nation which Dido founded when she landed in Libya were
accustomed to appease the gods by human sacrifices and to offer
up their young children, - horri ble to t ell- upon fiery altars.
Each year the lot was cast and the tragedy was repeated, recalling the sacrifices offered to Diana in the kingdom of Thoas.
And now Hanno, the ancient enemy of Hannibal, demander' the
general's son, as the customary victim to suffer this doom
according to the lot.
The practice of human sacrifice was, in fact, so integral a
part of the Carthaginian religion, its necessity so deeply rooted in the tradition of the people, that it actually survived the
destruction of the city and after the founding of Roman Carthage,
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was taken up again, persisting far into the Christian Era. Tertullian, in his day, c ould write :41uInfantes penes Africam Saturno immolabantur palam usque ad proconsulatum Tiberii ••.•. Sed
et nunc in occulto perseverat hoc sacrum facinus."
With the full horror of this dominant feature of Carthaginian religion in mind, it is not difficult to understand how
Polybius could 'say without prejudice :42"But the quality in which
the Roman commonwealth is most distinctly superior is, in my
opinion, the nature of their religious convictions. ft
IV. Spirit And National Virtue
Applying the universal standards of prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude to the people of Carthage,- judging them
not by single instances but by established traits and by general statements of the ancients,- what can be said of their moral
character, of their national virtue?
First, in regard to prudence, it is evident that the Carthaginians could never have planned their government so efficiently, nor have raised themselves to the head of a vast commercial
empire, maintaining sovereign sway over the western Mediterranean for centuries, without a great fund of native shrewdness and
ingenuity. They were known for their subtlety and feared for
their ability to outwit an opponent by stratagem. Cicero, moreover, remarks: 43lf Nec tantum Carthago habuisset Op1L.-n sexcentos
fere annos sine consiliis et disciplina." Yet, prudent as they
were in the very practical matters of government, commerce, and
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empire, the Carthaginians were limited in their perception of
higher spiritual values, au has been pointed out before; they
were a religious people, it is true, yet their religion apparently never arose beyond the level of fear and propitiation.
They were prudent as far as they saw, but their vision never
pierced much beyond the material.
The sources have much to say against the Carthaginian sense
of justice. No other people in the ancient world acquired such
wide notoriety for faithlessness to agreements. "Punica fides 1t
was a synonym for infidelity. It is certainly no more than fact
that Carthage broke international law in plundering temples and
tombs, that she oppDessed her subject peoples with unjust taxation, that she betrayed her mercenaries and mistreated her generals. On this last point Diodorus is most specific, condemning
it as a maker of tyrants: 44
The chief cause of this is the cruelty of the Carthaginians
in dealing out punishment. They raise their most capable men to
posts of high command in time of war, forcing them, as a rule, .
to bear the whole responsibility. But when peace returns they
trump up charges against these very men, and haling them before
unjust tribunals for fear of their power, overwhelm them with
punishments. This is why some of their leaders, out of fear of
judgment, desert their posts, w hile others turn to tyranny.
The Carthaginians must have maintained a certain minimum of
justice in the ordinary conduct of state affairs, otherwise the
government could not have functioned so long without violent
revolt, as Cicero has pointed out. But certainly the evidence 1s
all against the possibility of a high esteem, or a high degree
of 1ustice

Amcm.Q'

them.
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The rapidity with which the

~arthaginians

alternated in times

of stress between deep despair and frenzied exaltation bespeaks
a lack of restraint, of temperance, in their character. This
change from one extreme to the other has been seen on the occasion of Agathocles' invasion, when, after defeat, their fear
took a violent form, while after a subsequent victory the same
violence was manifest in their rejoicing. The trait is well
illustrated by the wild extravagances with which the Carthaginians reacted to the Roman ultimatum before the Third Punic WaD,
vividly portrayed by Appian: 45
Then followed a scene of blind, raving madness, like the
strange acts which the Maenads are said to perform when under
the influence of Bacchus. Some fell upon those senators who had
advised giving the hostages and tore them in pieces ••••• Others
treated in a similar way those who had favored giving up the
arms. Some stoned the ambassadors for bringing the bad news, and
others dragged them through the city. Still others, meeting certain Italians, who were caught among them in this sudden and unexpected mischance, maltreated them in various ways, ••••• The
city was full of wailing and wrath, of fear and threatenings.
People roamed the streets invoking whatever was most dear to
them and took refuge in the temp~ s as in asylums. They upbraided their gods for not even being able to defend themselves. Some
went into the arsenals and wept when they found them empty.
Others ran to the dockyards and bewailed the ships that had been
surrenderee to perfidious men ••••• Most of all was their anger
kindled by the mothers of the hostages who, like Furies in a
tragedy, accosted those whom they met with shrieks, and reproached them with giving away their children against their protest,
or mocked at them, saying that the gods were now taking vengeance
on them for the lost children. The few who remained sane closed
the gates, and brought stones up0n the walls to be used in place
of catapults.
There was, moreover, among the Carthaginians a marked teniency toward luxuriousness, evident in their clothing and decoration, the sumptuousness of their estates, and in the national
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institution of public banquets, analogous to the sysitia of
Sparta, as Aristotle remarks: 46n Po1nts in which the Carthaginian
constitution resembles the Spartan are the common mess-tables
of its Comradships corresponding to the Phiditia, etc ••••• " Unlike the stern purpose of the Spartan messes, which were instituted to promote military spirit, the public dinners of the
Carthaginians were organised by the "Comradships" evidently for
social purposes, and later took on the aspect of unofficial political gatherings or caucuses, as can be inferred from Livy, who
speaks of Hannibal's attempt to arouse the Carthaginians to war,
after his exile: 47 "Et primo in circulis conviviisque celebrata
sermonilbu.s res est; deinde in senatu quidem ••••• " What must the
table service have been at these banquets in the capital when
the drinking cups of Carthaginian officers in the field were
precious enough to satisfy a mutinous army of mercenaries in the
Sicilian expedition of 406 B.C.1 Diodorus records 49 that Hamilcar
the general, "persuaded the soldiers to be patient for a few
days more and presented them with the drinking cups of the native Carthaginians as a pledge of his faith."
But the greatest intemperance of the Carthaginians, what may
be called their predominant passion, was avarice, which has been
illustrated several times already, attested by the sources from
Aristotle to Polybius. It is enough to recall here the remark of
Polybius: 49 "At Carthage nothing which results in profit is regarded as disgraceful."
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Though it was apparently true that, as Polybius asserts,50
II

the Carthaginians ••. depend for the maintenance of thei r freedom

on the courage of a mercenary force," and "Italians in general
naturally excel Phoenicians and Africans in bodily strength and
personal courage," still the conclusion must be qualified by
two considerations: (in regard to the fortitude of the Carthaginians) (1) At one period of their history they give evidence
of a general increase in patriotism and courage. (2) At times
of desperate crisis they were capable of an astonishing reckless
daring.
The period during which public spirit may be said to have
reached its height among the Carthaginians extends roughly from
383 B. C., when the citizens themselves were, for the first time
enlisted as common soldiers in any considerable number, to about
308, when an entire citizen army turned out against Agathocles.
The details have been given in discussing the armies of Carthage
( vd. supra IE). There it has been noted that 10,OOOnative
Carthaginians took part in the expedition of 339 against Timoleon, and that in the first clash with Agathocles in Africa, the
Sacred Cohort made a brave stand in the face of defeat and the
loss of their leader. There is, then, more solid evidence of
courage and public spirit during this period than at any other
up to the time of the Third Punic War. Moreover, Aristotle, a
contemporary of this period, notes 5l that "among some peoples
there were even certain laws stimulating military valor; for
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instance at Carthage, we are told, warriors receive the decoration of armlets of the same number as the campaigns on which
they have served." This proves that the increase in valor was
not simply haphazard, but deliberately promoted by the government; it is the only evidence we have of a positive attempt on
the part of the Carthaginians to foster any of the national
virtues.
It may be noted that Carthage at this period,- the greater
part of the fourth century- is remarkable in several respects.
This is the Carthage which Aristotle knew, whose constitution
won his esteem, whose promotion of valor he notes. The Carthaginians at this time manifest a nobler spirit, fight their own
battles, and even merit a word of praise from Diodorus for their
52
conduct after the battle of Cronium in 383 B.C.: "The Carthaginians bore their success like gentlemen, sending envoys to invite Dionysius to come to terms." This period precisely saw the
imported gods of the Greeks rise in popular favor, and the old
practices of human sacrifice and Melcarth worship slip into decline. Material prosperity, too, paralleled the rise in other
forms of culture; the city had been beautified with Sicilian art
at the end of the preceding century; during the long periods of
peace from 367 B.C. to 344, and again, after Timoleon, from 337
to the invasion of Agathocles in 308, commerce thrived and the
Carthaginian power in Sicilty expanded; the evident results of
this prosperity can be seen in the richness of the countryside
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as Agathocles found it (vd. supra I C). All these considerations
point to this as the peak period of Carthaginian civilization
and culture.
The changes which took place after the invasion of Agathocles,
- the return of the old religious practices, renewed dependence
on mercenaries, the gradual break down of constitutional balance
in the direction of oligarchy, etc.- have been discussed in their
proper sections. vVhat is important for our purpose is the realizationthat the decline had begun almost half a century before
the first Punic War, so that it was not with Carthage at her
purest and best that Rome

fought~

~ut

with a corrupting civili-

zation and culture. by the time of the Second Punic War the
change was evident enough to draw from Polybius the remark: 53
At the time when they entered on the Hannibalic War, the Carthaginian constitution had degenerated, and that of Rome was
better ••••• For by as much as the power and prosperity had been
earlier than that of Rome, by so much had Carthage already begun
to decline; while Rome was exactly at her prime, as far, at
least, as her system of government was concerned.
If then, Carthage at her height only approximates the religion and the courageous spirit of Rome, the breach between the
two in this respect must have been all the wider at the time of
the Punic Wars.
Instances

l~ve

already been given of the desperate kind of

courage displayed by the Carthaginians in time of unusual stress,
- that which inspired them, for example, to hold out so long
against overwhelming odds in the Third Punic War. Yet this courage was not so much a fixed habit as a frenzied reaction, which,
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for its very desperation, was all the more dangerous.
From these considerations, then, we may conclude that the Carthaginians were never, in the last extreme, cowards; yet during
a single period only did their courage rise to. anything like the
stability of genuine fortitude.
Finally, Plutarch alone among the ancient authorities attemptE
a general characterization of the Carthaginians as a people. His
comment on their spirit is the only passage we have which aims
at telling, not what they did, but what they
them thus: 54

~.

He describes

Quite different is the character of the Carthaginian people;
it is bitter, sullen, subservient to their magistrates, harsh to
their subjects, most abject when afraid, most savage when enraged, stubborn in adhering to its decisions, disagreeable and hard
in its attitude toward playfulness and urbanity. Never would
these people, if a Clean had asked them to postpone the meeting
of the assembly on the ground that he had made sacrifice and had
guests to entertain, have adjourned the meeting amid laughter
and the clapping of hands; nor would they, when a quail escaped
from Alcebiades' cloak while he was speaking, have joined eagerly in hunting it down and then have given it back to him; no,
they would have put them both to death for their insolence and
their flippancy, seeing that they banished Hanno on the charge
of aspiring to be tyrant, because he used a lion on his campaign
to carry his luggage.
This characterization, though perhaps flavored by Greek bias,
is in general accord with the impression left by Carthaginian
religious practices. It is evident too that a people of little
restraint or regard for virtue, of few ideals above the material,
could hardly have enjoyed any great urbanity or freedom of sp"irit.
The moral culture of the Carthaginians may be summarized thus:
I) Their religion, during most of their history, was that of
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their Phoenician ancestors" centering about the Moloch-MelcarthAstarte triad and characterized by one authority thus: liThe character of Phoenician religion and of the people who held it was
at once impure and cruel. n55
II) Their outstanding religious practice, at least in the
minds of the Romans and Greeks, was the sacrifice of their children to Moloch" a rite which continued to the destruction of the
city" and beyond.
III) In point of virtue, the Carthaginians appear neither just
nor temperate" though they were certainly prudent in temporal
matters and capable of reckless daring under stress. 'l'heir spiri t·
on Plutarch's authority, was sullen" cruel" unresponsive to
amenity.

v.

Intellectual Culture

Only the most meager traces of an intellectual culture survive, and these may be briefly recounted. The earliest recorded
fact of intellectual significance is a decree of the Carthaginian senate quoted by Justinus, 56lt facto senatus consulto, 'ne quis
postea Carthaginiensis, aut litteris Graecis aut sermomi studereto
ne aut loqui cum hoste, aut scribere sine interprete posset.

rlf

The measure was occasioned by the discovery that a certain Suniatus, "potentissimus ea tempestate Poenorum,," had communicated
with Dionysius in Greek, attempting to betray the general Hanno
and the Sicilian expedition of 383 B.C •• The effect of the decree must have been to cut Carthage off from the influence of

l5~

Greek intellectual culture. Whatever there was of literature at
Carthage after that time would be thoroughly Punic.
That there was an interest in literature among the Carthaginians is proven by the fact that they possesseQ collections of
books, which were distributed to the native African chieftains
by order of the Roman senate when the city was destroyed. The
nature, extent, and value of these collections are unknown. One
work alone was deliberately preserved by the Romans,- Mago's
treatise on agriculture in twenty eight books. The esteem which
this work won from the Romans is attested by Pliny,57who mentions among other foreign authorities on agriculture "the Carthaginian Mago, whom our senata admired so much that when Carthage was taken and her libraries bestowed upon the African
chieftains, they decreed that his twenty eight books alone shoulc
be translated into Latin, despite the fact that M. Cato had already expounded the principles of the same subject." Varro testi·
fies to the popularity of the treatise, which had merited the
supreme recognition of being translated into Greek; after listing the most eminent writers on agriculture, he affirms: 58
All these are surpassed in reputation by Mago of Carthage,
who gathered into twenty eight books, written in the Punic tongue, the subjects they had dealt with separately. These Cassius
Dionysius of Utica translated into Greek and published in twenty
books, dedicated to the praetor Sextilius.
And Columella adds the final word of praise,59"paying greatest
reverence to the Carthaginian Mago as the father of husbandry."
In this type of literature, then, preeminence is ceded to a Car-
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thaginian author.
Sallust made use of some Carthaginian historical works, preserved probably by the Africans to whom they had been given: 60
What men inhabited Africa originally, and who came later or
how the races mingled, I shall tell as briefly as possible. Although my account varies from the prevailing tradition, I give
it as it was translated to me from the Punic books said to have
been written by king Hiempsal.
Finally, the only Carthaginian work extant is the travel
acco1mt of Hanno, known as his Periplus, mentioned by Pliny61
with another of the same natwe: "Also when the power of Carthag
flourished Hanno sailed round from Cadiz to the extremity of
Arabia, and published a memoir of his voyage, as did Hamilco
when dispatched at the same date to explore the outer coasts of
Europe."
Agriculture, history, travel,- it is the type of literature
we would expect from a people occupied with practical matters.
Whether the Carthaginians ever produced much of aesthetic or
speculative value we cannot tell; their background and nature
makes it seem unlikely.
Finally, there is evidence that philosophy was culti vated,'at
Carthage, at least in the final period of her history. Clitomachus, who became head of the Academy in 129 B.C., was a native
of Carthage, where he had instructed others in philosophy before
coming to Athens to study under Carneades. We know of him chiefly from Diogenes Laertius, who leaves the following account: 62
Clitomachus was a Carthaginian, his real name being Hasdrubal,
and he taught Philosophy at Carthage in his native tongue. He had
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reached his fortieth year when he went to Athens and became a
pupil of Carneades. And Carneades recognizing his industry,
caused him to be educated and took part in training him. And to
such lengths did his diligence go that he composed more than
four hundred treatises. He succeeded Carneaaes in the headship
of the school, and by his writings did much to elucidate his
opinions. He was eminently well acquainted with the three sects,
- the Academy, the Peripatetics, and the stoics.
From the fact that he found pupils at Carthage it is evident
that the Carthaginians could not have been entirely indifferent
to philosophical pursuits, though, again, there is no way of
determining the extent of their interest.
This brief data, then,

c~mprises

the bulk of our knowledge of

Carthaginian intellectual life. It would be rash to conclude
that this phase of their culture was therefore inconsiderable;
we would be

j~dging

them as Samuel Johnson did the Athenians

when he declared that they were barbarous because they had few
books. Yet, on the other hand, if the Carthaginians had produced
anything comparable to the intellectual monuments of Greece and
Rome, it is not likely that such productions would have perished
utterly. Masterpieces, especially of literature, have a way of
surviving.
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HocnoMlitate Mago Carthaginiensis praeteriit, Poenica
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59 De Re Rustica, 1,1,13:
,
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60 Bellum Jugurthin~, XVII,7:
Sed quo mortales initio Africam habuerint, quique postea
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ab ea fama quae plerosque optinet divorsum est, tamen uti
ex libris Punicis, qui regis Hiempsalis dicebantur,' interpretatum nobis est •.• quam paucissimis dicam.
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CONCLUSION
Out of the mass of details recorded by the ancients the
dominant factor of CarthaKinian civilization and culture appear
clear and vivid.

The study of the elements of civilization

has revealed the Carthaginian law was well formulated but
poorly enforced; the wisdom of the constitution of Carthage
was vitiated by outstanding defects in the national character venality, cruelty, expediency, factiousness. The strength of
that character, on the other hand, lay mainly in the keen
practical wisdom of the Carthaginians and their surprising
capacity for reckless daring and fierce resistance in the face
of a crisis. Their civil character, then, was shrewd and
powerful, but defective in the higher qualities of magnanimity,
humaneness, unity of spirit, and fidelity to principle.
The study of Carthaginian culture illustrates, explains,
and enforces this general characterization. In keeping with her
nature as a merchant state, the material element was the most
highly developed in the culture of Carthage.

The city itself

was impressive in its buildings, strongly fortified, with
cleverly constructed harbors and rich adornments, the work
largely of foreign craftsmen and artists. The agricultural
system of the surrounding countryside was a model for the
ancient world, and resources within the city were abundant
enough to last through many a long siege. The inhabitants were
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shaBply divided into four classes, with the wealthy merchants
in their luxurious robes and jewelry occupying an exclusive
position at the top. The large armies of Carthage were for the
most part a motley aggregation of mercenaries, though in times
of stress the citizens proved themselves capable of high
courage. But the strongest arm of the empire city was her
navy, which was magnificently equipped, but finally lost
because of neglect and false economy.

'lath this she controlled

the entire Western Mediterranean, drawing from her colonies
and subjects along its shores vast revenues through trade,
taxation, and natural resources.

Carthage established this

empire through conquest and a shrewd system of colonization,
held it by force of arms and economic sanctions, a common
coinage and a

co~mon

religion, kept it exclusive for her own

gain. But this selfish purpose, pursued throu3h overburdening
taxation and cruel exploitation, won her the hatred of her
subjects, provoked rebellion, and ultimately contributed to
her complete destruction.
The Carthag1ntans aroused the animosity of others than her
subject nations, moreover, by certain elements in her moral
culture. The gods of carthage were Eastern deities - Moloch,
Astarte, Melcarth, Eshmun - though there is evidence that she
adopted some of the Greek 30dS at one period of her history.
Her native gods were worshipped with dark and secret rites,
among them the repugnant practice of human sacrifice.

Judged

by the standard of the cardinal virtues, the Carthaginians
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were prudent in a limited, practical way, but failed badly
in justice; in fact, ItPunica fides" became universally known
as the antithesis of justice and honor. The Carthaginians were
subject to wild extremes of fear and exaltation, luxurious,
and above all, avaricious. They were never cowards in the face
of danger, but only during one period - roughly from 380 to
310 B.C., and incidentally the Same period that saw the introduction of Greek gods - did they rise to anything like a
genuine spirit ot patriotism and fortitude. This, perhaps the
peak period of Carthaginian culture, had come to an end by the
time of the Punic Wars, and Home fought a nation that had
slipped back into its inveterate vices, characterized by a
public spirit which Plutarch describes as sullen and harsh,
at one time abject in fear, at another savage in anger,
stubborn, disagreeable and hard.
There is little to be said of intellectual culture at
Carthage.

Mention is made of large libraries, but only a few

meager traces remain, - a travelogue, the title of a treatise
on agriculture, a word about histories - which seem to indicate
a practical literature.

And yet, toward the end of her

existence, there is evidence of an interest in philosophy at
Carthage, for Clitomachus came from there after having taught
for some years. It is not likely, however, from what we know
of their other qualities, that the Carthaginians were much
concerned with speculation, or that they ever produced a great
literature, since little more than a title has survived the

l6t

the test of time.
This, then, is the civilization and culture of Carthage as
portrayed by the writers of Greece and Rome. The picture is a
single, consistent whole, and offers in general a solid
historical basis for Chesterton's sue:gest1on that the Punic
V'lars were a clash of opposing cultures. To demonstrate this
in detail would require a careful comparison of Carthaginian
civilization and culture with that of Rome at the time of the
Punic Wars - a separate study in itself. The end of this
investigation is attained if Chesterton's impression of
Carthage is shown to be verified by the testimony of the
ancients. We sincerely hope that it has.

I.J.D.S.
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